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CONSTITUTIONAL  ADJUDICATION:
THE  ELEVENTH  AMENDMENT  AND
STATE SOVEREIGN  IMMUNITY
Vicki C. Jackson*
The Court's Eleventh Amendment and sovereign  immunity  case
law deserves the condemnation and resistance of scholars.  The Court
has for the last ten years chosen to expand the range of government
immunity from suit for wrongdoing, a result compelled neither by his-
tory nor logic.  But in elevating state sovereign immunity to the status
of a constitutional principle of the first order, the Court has not met
with the barrage of criticism I believe it deserves  on this front.  While
there has been no shortage of critics, there has also been no shortage
of good thoughtful  scholarship  defending  or seeking  to rationalize
the Court's results.  While I believe it is an important function of legal
scholarship  to  constructively  critique  and  seek  to  rationalize  the
Court's decisions, I hope in the first portion of this Article to explain
why I do not think these decisions are worthy of that effort, and why
scholars who believe  the Court is incorrect in its expansion of sover-
eign immunity into a first order constitutional principle ought to call
for the overruling of these decisions.'
*  Professor  of Law,  Georgetown  University  Law  Center.  My  thanks  to Jim
Pfander, who  organized  the American  Association  of Law Schools  (AALS)  Federal
Courts  Panel January 8,  2000, for which  this Article  was prepared  and  to the  Notre
Dame Law Review for publishing  this Symposium.  My gratitude  to my husband  and
best critic, Robert Taylor, for his willingness  to read yet another draft paper on the
11th Amendment,  and to Jim Pfander,  Carlos Vgzquez,  and Ann Woolhandler  for
helpful  comments  on  earlier  drafts.  Thanks  also  to  my  research  assistants  Beth
Heinold, Shannon McNulty, and Mike Ryan for their good-natured  and very helpful
research assistance.
1  For an additional analysis and critique of last Term's sovereign immunity deci-
sions, see Vicki C. Jackson,  Seductions of Coherence, State Sovereign Immunity and the Dena-
tionalization of Federal  Law, 31  RuTGEas LJ.  (forthcoming 2000).NOTRE  DAME  LAW  REVIEW
Let me be clear at the outset that I do not ground my critique of
the Court's Seminole Tribe v. Florida 2 and Alden v. Maine 3 decisions, nor
my plea for the Court to overrule itself, on a claim that the Constitu-
tion requires  "full remediation"  for all wrongs or for all violations  of
federal  law.  Remedial  systems  need  to  be  designed  with  multiple
goals in mind.4  As John Jeffries reminded us in a recent and elegant
essay,  some  forms  of relief may be  limited in  order  to  avoid  unin-
tended and undesirable consequences of deterring socially useful con-
duct.5  But limits on remedies for violations of federal rights should be
grounded  in reason  and function, wherever  possible;  and while  his-
tory has some role to play, it must be consulted with caution where it
is ambiguous and where one contested historical interpretation is op-
posed  to current understandings  of justice.  Federal  courts  scholars,
like other constitutional scholars, should not be afraid of invoking the
Preamble to the Constitution to inform interpretive choices that must
be made-including  its commitment to the formation of a "more per-
fect Union" and to "establishing Justice."6  That sovereign  immunity
may have long provenance-as  did prayer in schools, as  did the sup-
pression of women, as did Jim Crow laws-does not end the questions
of whether  the immunity  is  constitutionally  compelled, how the  im-
munity can be overcome, how broadly it extends, and who shares in it.
In the second portion of this Article, I comment more specifically
on  the arguments  of Professors  Vzquez7  and Woolhandler,s  as was
my assigned role at the American Association of Law Schools  (AALS)
panel.  In brief, while I find Professor Woolhandler's  scholarship  al-
ways  illuminating, I  question her effort to justify  the  Court's recent
sovereign immunity decisions as based on a defensible  distinction be-
tween  new and  old  property for  three  reasons:  first, the  historical
practice  does not speak to Congress's  powers  to overcome  common
2  517 U.S.  44  (1996).
3  119  S.  Ct. 2240  (1999).
4  For a thoughtful discussion of the competing constitutional traditions and in-
terests, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer,  New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
Constitutional  Remedies, 104  HARV.  L. REV.  1733  (1991).
5  SeeJohn C.Jeffries,Jr.,  The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional  Law, 109 YALE L.J.
87 (1999)  (arguing that the qualified immunity doctrine for government officials  is
necessary to avoid  over-deterring  official  action  and to allow  room for the develop-
ment and evolution of legal standards  governing their conduct).
6  U.S. CONST. preamble;  see a/soJohn  Paul Stevens, IsJustice  Irrelevant?, 87 Nw. U.
L.  REv. 1121  (1993).
7  See Carlos Manuel Vdzquez,  Eleventh Amendment Schizophrenia, 75 NOTRE DAME
L.  REV. 859  (2000).
8  See Ann  Woolhandler,  Old  Property, New  Property, and Sovereign Immunity, 75
NOTRE  DAME L. REv. 919  (2000).
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law immunity; second, the historic practice she focuses on is primarily
from the nineteenth  century and does not fully account for the  last
century's  decisions;  and third,  the normative justifications  she  prof-
fers, while  they would support rules  limiting the form of compensa-
tory awards that could be entered against sovereign  governments, do
not support the present rules of immunity.  Professor Vizquez's care-
ful examination  of the  analytical foundations  of the Court's  recent
cases  illuminates their internal tensions, though I suggest he may be
reading too much into the Court's analysis of Section  5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment.9  I take issue with his qualified defense  of consti-
tutionalizing  official  immunities  (especially  for  executive  branch
officers),  a position that I understand to be at least in part driven by
considerations  of coherence  with  a strand  of the Court's  sovereign
immunity decisions that he seems essentially to disagree with.  Finally,
I note, neither Professor Woolhandler's invocation of history tojustify
distinctions  in the treatment of different forms of property interests,
nor Professor Vdzquez's concern for constructing the best (or a good)
system for deterring  governmental  law violations,  correspond to the
Court's own explanations of its decisions.
In the closing Section of this Article, I identify a further difficulty
in understanding  the Court's  treatment of state sovereign immunity
claims and make a suggestion for an alternative doctrine to better cap-
ture legitimate national interests in preserving both the states and the
federal government as governments.  First, I explore the Court's para-
doxical treatment of federalism and the Fourteenth Amendment from
the  perspective  of interpretive  strategies  for  dealing  with  constitu-
tional compromises and constitutional principles.  When will the fed-
eralism  features  of  the  Constitution  be  treated  as  political
compromises,  not generalizable  to principles broader  than required
by the  Constitution's  text, and when  will the federalism  features be
treated as sources of deep, principled values, emanating implied limi-
tations  on national  power?  When  will provisions  that are  proposed
and ratified as "compromises" become  deep "principles"-and when
can deep  "principles" on ratification become "narrow compromises,"
or less deep principles, for purposes of interpretation?  I suggest that
even  those  who  believe that the Eleventh  Amendment bars  at least
some "federal question" cases from federal jurisdiction should see the
initial  adoption  of the Amendment  as  reflecting  a narrow  compro-
mise.  One could then ask whether circumstances have changed so as
to justify treating the Amendment as standing for a broader principle
9  U.S.  CONST.  amend XIV, § 5.
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of immunity-a process  that was  begun in  Hans v. Louisiana,' 0  cur-
tailed in the 1960s-80s, and then reinvigorated in  Seminole Tribe.1
Federalism does represent a deep  principle of the U.S. constitu-
tional system, one primarily to be secured through the political struc-
ture  of  the  Union.  Judicial  doctrine  should  be  designed  not  to
confront the political branches'  political judgments but rather to  as-
sure  that in  the political  process  the interests  that the Constitution
requires to be protected-interests  in the states continuing to exist as
independent  governments-have  been taken into account.  In addi-
tion to clear statement rules, I suggest that a presumption of symmetry
could be applied to  evaluate  the constitutionality of remedies against
states  provided  for in  federal  statutory  law  enacted  under Article  I
power.  This presumption would be designed to harness the national
political branches'  solicitude for the functioning of the federal  gov-
ernment to secure a comparable solicitude for the functioning of state
governments.  But sovereign  immunity  should be  of far less  impor-
tance in sustaining that federal structure than the Court's current doc-
trine contemplates, particularly since sovereign immunity is in conflict
with other  fundamental  principles  of the U.S.  constitutional  system
including the  rule of law and the supremacy  of federal law.
I.  A BRIF  CRITiQuE  OF  LAST TERM'S  TRLOGY
Since other contributions  to this Symposium clearly and fully ex-
plicate  the Court's decisions, 12 I will only briefly discuss some of their
most serious  shortcomings.
A.  Florida  Prepaid  v.  College Savings Bank
Of the three sovereign immunity decisions last Term, in some re-
spects  the most surprising  was  Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education
10  134 U.S.  1 (1890).
11  517 U.S.  44 (1996).
12  See, e.g.,  Daniel J.  Meltzer,  State Sovereign Immunity: Five Authors in Search of a
Theory, 75 NOTRE  DAME  L.  REV.  1011  (2000).  After the AALS  panel for which  this
Article was prepared, the Court decided Kimel v. Florida  Board of  Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631
(2000), holding that the Age Discrimination  in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C §§  621-34
(1994)  (ADEA)  was not  a valid  exercise  of Congress's  power to  enforce  the  14th
Amendment and thus could not constitutionally abrogate states' immunity from suit.
While  I do not address  Kimel here, note  that because  the ADEA's  extension  to the
states has been upheld under the Commerce  Clause,  the ADEA now appears  to be
like the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)  (1994),  and the patent laws: it is
a valid federal statute validly applied to cover activities of state governments but only
partially enforceable  as against those state governments.
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Expense Board v. College Savings Bank'1 3  The Court there held unconsti-
tutional the abrogation of states' immunity to suit in federal court on
patent infiingement  claims,  even  though the Court agreed that pat-
ents were  property,  the  deprivation  of which  without  due  process
could violate  the Fourteenth Amendment, which in turn would give
Congress power to abrogate states'  immunity.  The Court held the ab-
rogation unconstitutional, however, primarily because it found inade-
quate evidence before Congress of any unconstitutional state conduct,
other than a few asserted infiingements.  These infringements  might
constitute deprivations of property,14 but by themselves did not consti-
tute deprivations without due process of law.  Rather, the Court said,
Congress  should  have  examined  whether  state  law  remedies  for
proven infringements would have been sufficient to avoid an uncon-
stitutional  deprivation  of property.  The Court  thus apparently  con-
cluded that the mere assertion of sovereign immunity to a patent suit
in federal court was not sufficient to constitute a deprivation without
due  process  of law, since  there were  possibilities for relief either in
state courts or before  state legislatures. 15
In addition, the Court held, the remedy Congress provided-an
abrogation  of immunity  on all patent  claims against  any infringing
state-was  not  "proportionate"  to  possible  constitutional  injuries.
This  conclusion,  as  well,  rested  on the  absence  of evidence  before
Congress  that many states were infringing patents and failing to pro-
vide some form of process or remedy that the Court would find ade-
quate.  The opinion suggests  that because there was  no "pattern" of
state  infringements,  a  nationwide  remedy  would  be  disproportion-
ate.16  Moreover, even in the states against which infringement claims
had been  asserted,  it was  unclear  that there  were  inadequate  state
court remedies.17  Thus, in the Court's view, the Patent and Plant Va-
riety Protection Remedy Clarification Act's uniform abrogation of im-
13  119  S. Ct.  2199  (1999).
14  But see id at 2209-10  (suggesting that negligent infringements would not be
treated  as  "deprivations").  For a critical  discussion,  see Meltzer,  supra note  12,  at
1056-61.
15  See Forida  Prpaid,  119 S. Ct. at 2207  (characterizing the underlying conduct as
.state infringement of patents and the use of sovereign immunity to deny patent own-
ers compensation for the invasion of their patent rights");  id  at 2209 n.9 (noting that
Florida "provides remedies" for patent infringements by the state through  "a claims
bill" in the state legislature or a judicial remedy for takings or conversion).
16  Id. at 2207 ("Congress  identified no pattern of patent infringements by states,
let alone a pattern of constitutional violations.").
17  See id at 2207-10.
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munity could not be justified under the "proportionality" test of City of
Boerne v.  Flores.1 8
The decision is surprising, particularly in light of the harm it un-
doubtedly inflicts on commercial interests.  As Judge Fletcher's article
suggests,  when states engage in  commercial  activities  in competition
with private enterprise, the balance of federal interests as against state
sovereignty would favor federal power.19  The Court's holding repre-
sents an astonishing "denationalization" of federal law in an area that
had been exclusively federal.20  The enforceability of patent (and pos-
sibly  copyright)21  laws  as  against states,  which  are  becoming  major
users of patents and the patent system, will now depend in large mea-
sure on the individual decisions  of each state  as to what remedies to
provide.
Second, the decision reflects a disturbingly parsimonious view of
Congress's powers under the Fourteenth Amendment 22  I would have
18  521  U.S. 507, 519-20  (1997)  (stating that in using its Section  5 power prophy-
lactically to prohibit conduct that does not itself violate Section 1 of the 14th Amend-
ment, Congress  must choose  means that  are proportional  and congruent with  the
Section 1 violations it seeks to remedy or prevent).  For my earlier discussions of  /o-
res, see Vicki C. Jackson,  Ambivalent Resistance and Comparative Constitutionalism:  Open-
ing Up  the Conversation on  "Proportionality,"  Rights and Federalism, 1 U. PA. J.  CONST.  L.
583, 623-34  (1999)  (arguing that a proportionality standard, deferentially applied to
identify  instances  of gross  disproportionality  between  purported  ends and  chosen
means,  might function  as a milder  form of "pretext"  examination  of congressional
purpose),  and Jackson,  supra note  1  (arguing that  Florida Prepaid  was  a significant
extension of the rigor with which the Flores proportionality standard was applied).
19  See William A.  Fletcher,  The Eleventh Amendment:  Unfinished Business, 75 NOTRE
DAME L. REV.  843  (2000).
20  SeeJackson,  supra note 1.
21  But cf. Florida Prepaid,  119  S.  Ct. at 2215  n.9  (Stevens, J., dissenting)  (noting
bases  on which to  distinguish and uphold the Copyright  Remedy Clarification Act's
abrogation  of immunity).
22  Professor V;zquez argues that, given the Court's view that remedies other than
monetary suits against states are sufficient to protect the interests of the federal gov-
ernment  in  the supremacy  of federal  law,  it will be  almost impossible  to meet  the
standard he believes the Court has provided for 14th Amendment abrogations-that
abrogation  of immunity be  "genuinely necessary."  Vizquez,  supra note  7,  at  862,
897-900  (quoting College  Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd.,  119 S. Ct. 2219,  2225 (1999)).  Vdzquez reads this sentence-correctly, in a gram-
matical  sense-to suggest a requirement that, even  if Section  1 violations  are  estab-
lished,  the  particular  remedy  must  be  "genuinely  necessary."  Id.  He  appears  to
interpret this, in turn, to mean something like "absolutely necessary"-that  is, along
the lines of the interpretation  of the Necessary and  Proper Clause advocated by the
State of Maryland in McCulloch v. Maryland,  17 U.S.  (4 Wheat.) 316  (1819), which was
rejected by the Court.  Given these interpretations, Vdzquez goes on to argue that the
Court might find that so long as such other remedies as the Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.
123  (1908),  injunction  or the possibility of suit by  the United  States exists, no such
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thought Congress perfectly entitled to conclude that, since federal ju-
risdiction  over patents was  exclusive,  no  state would provide a state
court remedy for patent infringement.  It would thus also have been
reasonable for Congress  to conclude that, if states raised immunity as
a bar to federal patent infringement suits, they had denied due pro-
cess  of law in the most fundamental way-a claim of "deprivation of
property" being stated by a claim of patent infringement, the state was
denying the opportunity for law to operate to determine the truth and
value of the claim.
The Court's refusal  to treat invocation of sovereign immunity in
response to a claim of patent infringement as a denial of due process
authorizing Congress to overcome the immunity under its Fourteenth
Amendment powers is also surprising because of the clearly commer-
cial character of the activity in which states were engaged in competi-
absolute or "genuine" necessity can be established, and hence, Congress would never
have power to abrogate immunity.  See Vizquez, supra note 7, at 898.
However, it is not clear  to me that this is the best or most likely reading of this
portion of College Savings Bank,  though given Professor V~zquez's past success in read-
ing the tea leaves of the Court's opinions,  see Carlos Manuel V~zquez,  What Is Eleventh
Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE LJ. 1683,  1714-22  (1997),  there is no doubt reason
for concern.  But I would suggest an alternative  interpretation  of this language.  Re-
call that in  College Savings Bank (unlike in Florida  Prepaid) the Court found that the
first predicate for a Section  1 violation-that the Lanham Act protected a "property
interest"-did  not exist.  See  College Say. Bank, 119  S.  Ct. at  2224.  The  "genuinely
necessary" language may, then, hark back to a Boerne v. Flores  issue-of whether there
are any, or enough, "genuine" (in the Court's view) violations of Section 1 to author-
ize any prophylactic use of the Section  5 power- if there are no violations of the 14th
Amendment,  Congress's invocation of the Section  5 power may not be "genuine."
I fully agree with Professor Vdzquez that the Court's narrow interpretations  here
are in part motivated  by its desire to avoid  "undermining" Seminole Tribe by allowing
Congress to protedt rights created under Article  I statutes through the 14th Amend-
ment.  While  Professor Vfzquez  appears  to  find this effort  appropriate,  or at least
tolerable,  see VIzquez,  supra, at 1744 (characterizing  the use of the 14th Amendment
powers to authorize remedies against states for violating rights created under legisla-
tion under Article  I as  threatening to  "reduce  Seminole  Tribe's...  holding to  noth-
ing"), I do not. I believe that this effort to deliberately trim Congress's  powers under
Section 5  of the 14th Amendment undervalues  the intended  nationalizing effect  of
the 14th Amendment on the protection of federally derived rights.  (Given the inven-
tiveness of lawyers,  and the possibilities  for flexibility offered  by our system of com-
mon law constitutional adjudication,  however, questions about the scope of the 14th
Amendment  in securing national  rights  against state action may now proceed to be
litigated in connection with the Privileges and Immunities  Clause, after Saenz v. Roe,
119  S.  Ct. 1518,  1526  (1999)).  Finally, while  I share  Professor Vdzquez's  concerns
about the effect of the Court's decisions on the protection of "countermajoritarian"
constitutional  rights  under  the  14th  Amendment,  see Vfzquez,  supra note  7,  at
898-90,  I am not so convinced that this Term's decisions render Section 5 a nullity-
though they do significantly impair its reach.
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tion  with private  businesses.  One  of the  principal  purposes  of the
1787 Convention's "more perfect Union" was to facilitate commercial
transactions  and  provide  a  more  secure  economic  environment
through a federally enforceable and uniform legal regime for the de-
velopment of trade.2 3  Moreover, when  states acted in a commercial
setting, long-standing doctrine was available that would have sustained
either a holding that states had waived their immunity by engaging in
federally regulated  commercial  conduct,24 or that the entity in  ques-
tion was not the "state" for purposes of the immunity.2 5  The Court, in
a companion  case, rejects  the waiver  theory and, apparently, the dis-
tinction between commercial and governmental  activities as a possible
basis for  curtailing  the  reach  of the immunity.2 6  The Court, in  my
judgment, was driven by a desire not to "circumvent" the "principle"
of Seminole Tribe by too easily permitting Congress to protect interests
created under Article  I  through its Fourteenth Amendment  powers.
In so  doing, the Court fell prey to the seductive  logic  of coherence,
falsely;  for it ignored other doctrines that it should  have cohered  to,
minimizing the nationalizing  effect of the Fourteenth Amendment.27
Finally, Forida  Prepaid  appears  to represent a very expansive view
of what procedures  will satisfy due process.  The Court not only sug-
gests that procedures and remedies less than those provided for in the
federal  patent  laws  will  suffice  to  satisfy due  process  concerns  that
arise from state infringements of private patents.  It also may be taken
to suggest that the states may not even need to extend a judicial rem-
edy,  implying  that  legislative  private  bills  may be  sufficient.28  At a
minimum,  however,  the  Court  was  prepared  to  reject  the  implied
finding of due  process violations  from the undeniable  uncertainties
23  See, e.g.,  MERRILLJENSEN,  THE  NEW NATION:  A HISTORY OF THE  UNITED  STATES
DURING  THE  CONFEDERATION  1781-1789, at 400-06  (Northeastern Classics  ed. 1981)
(arguing  that  while  state  legislation  on  foreign  trade  was  effective,  "American
merchants wanted a uniformity which only centralized control could provide"); JACK
RAKoVE,  ORIGINAL  MEANINGS:  POLITICS AND  IDEAS  IN  THE MAKING  OF Tm  CONSTTU-
TION 26-27  (1997).  I do not mean to suggest that the Constitution was designed only
to better protect commercial interests, but that this was one of its important purposes.
24  See, e.g., Parden v. Terminal  Ry.,  377 U.S.  184, 190-92  (1964),  overruled by  Col-
lege Say. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2228;  cf Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge  Comm'n, 359
U.S.  275  (1959).
25  See,  e.g.,  Briscoe  v.  Bank  of Ky.,  36  U.S.  (11  Pet.)  257  (1837);  Bank  of the
United States v. The Planters'  Bank, 22 U.S.  (9 Wheat.)  904  (1824).  The question of
whether the Florida Prepaid Fund was  an arm of the state had been litigated in  the
lower courts and was not before the Supreme  Court.  See infra note 35.
26  See College Say. Bank, 119  S. Ct. at 2230-33  & n.4.
27  SeeJackson,  supra note 1.
28  See Florida  Prepaid,  119  S.  Ct. at 2209-11  & n.9.
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surrounding the question  of what remedies would be available at the
state level for patent infringements.  The Court's apparent willingness
to allow states time to develop  remedies for infringements  of patents
under state law 29 led it to an unprecedented departure from exclusive
federal jurisdiction  over patent and copyright  that had been a bed-
rock of judicial federalism.
B.  College Savings Bank v. Florida  Prepaid
The Court's holding in  College Savings Bank v. Florida  Prepaid  Post-
secondary Education  Expense Board 30  was somewhat less surprising.  The
Court decided that the Lanham Act's ban on unfair methods of com-
petition did not protect "property" for purposes  of the Due Process
Clause-perhaps  for  some  of  the  reasons  suggested  by  Professor
Woolhandler's  article.3'  The lower court had so held, reasoning that
recognition of the claim could open the states to rather unlimited and
difficult to predict forms of damages.  The Court may have been seek-
ing to limit the constraining nationwide effects of a broader definition
of property.
What was more surprising was that the Court took the opportu-
nity to reject the doctrine  of waiver by engaging in regulated activity.
In order to so hold, the Court had to overrule yet another of its earlier
state sovereign  immunity  cases-Parden  v.  Terminal Railway 32-from
1964.  Given the degree  to which state governments  have undertaken
commercial activities in competition with private enterprise,33  it is un-
29  Cf Ann Althouse,  The Alden  Trilogy: Still Searchingfor  a Way to Enforce Federalism,
31 RuTGERs LJ. (forthcoming 2000)  (arguing that the Court's decisions provide both
Congress and the states  opportunities in the future to prove their trustworthiness in
design and administration  of federal  rights, including for states the  opportunity to
provide appropriate relief in state courts for infringements  of patents).
30  119 S. Ct. 2219  (1999).
31  See generally Woolhandler,  supra note 8.
32  377 U.S.  184 (1964).
33  For example, all 50 states  currently offer either a prepaid tuition and/or tui-
tion savings plan.  See State of the States: State College Savings Plan Overview (visited Jan.
10,  2000)  <http://wrvw.coegesavings.org/state-table.htm>;  see  also J.  Timothy
Philipps  & Ed R. Haden,  It's Not Love, But It's Not Bad: A Response to Critics of Prepaid
College Tuition Plans, 26 U.  RICH.  L. REv.  281,  309-310  (1992)  (asserting that state
plans allow the middle class to save for college without being sophisticated investors);
Amy  Remus Scott, Note,  A  Commerce Clause Challenge to New  York's  Tax Deduction for
Investment in Its Own Tuition Savings Program,  25 U. MIcHi.J.L.  RExolne  379, 379  (1999)
(finding that these programs provide  attractive  alternatives to private investment be-
cause  they "offer significant federal tax benefits to individuals who invest in the pro-
grams").  Patents have been  issued to  state universities,  presumably for competitive
use in  such fields as biomedical  technology.  See Florida  Prepaid,  119 S. Ct. at 2215 &
n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting);  see also Rebecca Eisenberg, Public  Research and Private  De-
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tenable  to  have  a doctrine  that  allows  states-when  acting in  their
commercial capacity-to compete at so substantial  an advantage with
private businesses.  As Judge Fletcher suggests  in his article,  the argu-
ments in favor of permitting Congress to subject states to suit under a
statute Congress has enacted under the commercially oriented powers
of Article  I may be  as  compelling  (though for  different reasons)  as
under the Fourteenth Amendment.  States should have less legitimate
reason  to  object to  application  of the  provisions  of statutes  enacted
under Article  I, which  are typically directed at business  activities  en-
gaged in by private entities that the states have  chosen to be involved
in as well.34  Certainly the provision of long-term investment opportu-
nities to  pay for the education  of one's children  has long been  the
subject of private enterprise, with which the State  of Florida, through
the Florida Prepaid Educational  Investment Fund, entered into com-
petition.35  The  concept  of constructive  waiver,  constrained  (as  per
velopment: Patents and Technology  Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82  VA.  L.
REV.  1663  (1996).  At least 38 states use lotteries for the raising of state  revenue, but
Nevada does  not permit a state  lottery, "[p]erhaps  [because]  this would be seen  as
competing with one of the states' major industries."  NATIONAL SURVEY  OF STATE LAWS
511  (Richard A. Leiter ed.,  2d ed.  1997).  Commercial  aviation also appears  to face
competition from government entities that receive  "payment for commercial air serv-
ices while at the same time claiming exemption from most regulations administered
by the FAA  as  'public aircraft.'"  Lorraine  B.  Halloway,  New  Challenge  for the Private
Sector: Competition  from "Public  Aircraft," 8-SPG AIR & SPACE LAW 1 (1994)  (arguing that,
by claiming  exemptions from  regulation,  government  operated  public  aircraft  are
able to operate  at lower costs than commercial  aircraft).  In addition,  investment of
public pension funds  gives states  considerable  influence in  the private sector.  "For
firms, public pension systems can represent both  a source of more than $1.7  trillion
in investment funds and an occasional  meddlesome voice in corporate  governance."
Steven L. Willborn, Public  Pensions and the Uniform Management of  Public  Employee Retire-
ment Systems Act, 51  RuTGERS L. REv. 141,  142  (1998);  see also Roberta Romano, Public
Pension Fund Activism  in Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93  COLUM.  L.  REV.  795
(1993).
34  See Fletcher, supra note  19, at 849.
35  In the district court, College  Savings Bank argued, unsuccessfully, that Florida
Prepaid should not be treated as an "arm of the state" entitled to share in the state's
11th Amendment immunity.  Despite the fact that the fund had not been supported
by state taxes and had its own liability insurance,  the district court, applying the Third
Circuit's multi-factor  test, found that it was  an arm  of the  state because,  inter alia,
Florida statutory  law extends  immunity to all state agencies and requires appropria-
tions  to pay judgments against those agencies.  See College  Sav. Bank v. Florida  Pre-
paid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 948 F. Supp. 400, 411  (D.N.J.  1996).  It would
not be surprising if one  response to  College Savings Bank and Florida  Prepaid in  the
future were  a restriction  on the circumstances  in which 11th Amendment doctrine
would  allow states  to  shelter  commercial  enterprises  with  the states'  constitutional
immunity.
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the federal government's argument) to activities states undertake that
are not core  sovereign  functions,36 would  have afforded  a far more
sensible accommodation  of historic traditions of immunity and estab-
lished doctrines of national  legislative power.
C.  Alden v. Maine
Finally, in Alden v. Maine, 37 the Court held that the federal Con-
stitution  guaranteed states an immunity from suit by private persons
in their own courts on federal causes of action.  The Court reasoned
that the Constitution contains an implicit, deep principle of state sov-
ereign  immunity, which  does not derive  from the Eleventh  Amend-
ment  but  of  which  the  Eleventh  Amendment  is  merely  one
expression.  This  immunity from  suit without consent  exists  in  the
state courts and exists with respect to otherwise validly created federal
causes of action.
1.  Justice and Constitutional  Interpretation
Under the Court's holdings in  Seminole Tribe and Alden, the fol-
lowing injustice results: Alden, who was entitled to be paid at overtime
rates for certain work he performed  as a state probation officer, can
36  See Brief for the United States at 21,  College Say. Bank (No. 98-149)  (limiting
constructive waiver argument so as not to extend to "activities [the state] cannot real-
istically choose to abandon, such as the operation of a police force").  The proposed
constraint would reinvigorate  a concept close  to the rejected "traditional state func-
tions" concept developed in National  League of Cities v.  Usery, 426 U.S. 833  (1976)  and
rejected as unworkable in San Antonio Metropolitan Transit  Authority v. Garcia,  469 U.S.
528  (1985).  Some version of this concept is, however, likely to emerge from the cur-
rent Court's federalism jurisprudence.  See, e.g.,  Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.  898,
931-33  (1997)  (suggesting a distinction between laws targeting states and laws having
incidental  effect on state activities, with the latter subject to review of various factors
concerning whether  it "excessively interfered" with  state  government functioning).
Moreover,  as both Deborah Merritt and I have argued, albeit on somewhat different
grounds, the Constitution itself provides guidance on what the core functions are.  See
Vicki  C. Jackson,  Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz  and Principle,  111
HAv. L. Rxv. 2180, 2246-55 (1998); DeborahJones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause  and
State Autonomy: Federalism  for a Third Century, 88  COLUM.  L. REv.  1  (1988).  Were the
United States government's theory adopted, for example, it would not be proper to
treat the convening of a state legislature as a "constructive consent" to application of
any and all federal statutory standards that might by terms apply.  If the Court were to
adhere to its full-blown version of state sovereign immunity, the theory of constructive
consent as applied to states' commercial activities might become a workable and use-
ful constitutional doctrine.  But as set forth in Part III.D,  infra, there may be better
doctrinal alternatives  than  immunity to safeguard  important constitutional  interests
in the continued  constitutional role of the states.
37  119  S.  Ct. 2240  (1999).
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seek relief neither in federal court nor in state  court for the State's
violation of valid federal law, enacted for the benefit of all employees
of workforces  beyond  a certain  size.  As  the  Court notes,  there  are
some remedies available to enforce the still valid federal overtime pay
obligations  as  against the states:  If the state  persists in its violations,
Alden  could obtain an injunction  against state  officers  to restrain fu-
ture violations; but the state is permitted  to have violated his rights in
the  past without  any  effective  remedy  for  the  injured  employee.38
Such an unjust result-a refusal to provide to the injured individual a
remedy for violation of a "vested legal right"39-should  not have been
reached except under the strongest  constitutional compulsion.
This  is  not to  say  that the  Constitution must be read  as justice
requires; justice  may not have much  to  say  about the separation  of
powers, for instance, and even if an objection from concepts ofjustice
and  democracy could be made, for example,  to the Senate, the  text
and history are clear.  But when there are interpretive choices that are
open  under  constitutional  text,  structure,  history, and precedent,40
the  Court  should generally  choose  the  more just interpretation  if it
can  discern  what  that  is.  Here  the  task  of  discernment  was  not
difficult.
38  The Court also places weight on the fact that the United  States can constitu-
tionally bring  an enforcement  action,  collect the  past due  amounts,  and  pay them
over to Alden.  See Alden, 119  S. Ct. at 2268.  While  the Court  argued that this,  to-
gether  with the prospective  injunction,  will be adequate  to secure  the  effective  en-
forcement  of federal  law and implied that the failure  of the  United  States to itself
assert Alden's  claim suggests its relative  unimportance,  the Court seems profoundly
misguided  here:  For it  is  at  once  a protection  of liberty, an  integral  part  of the
broader jurisprudence  of Article III jurisdiction,  and a feature  of effective  enforce-
ment of laws designed to protect specific beneficiaries  for those beneficiaries  them-
selves-the  actually injured individual parties-to be able  to bring an action.
39  Marbury v. Madison, 5  U.S.  (1 Cranch)  137, 162-63  (1803)  (asserting that the
protection  of "vested legal rights" is in its nature judicial).
40  There  can  be no  doubt that  the  Court had  an  "open" choice.  Indeed,  the
Court  devotes  a lengthy section  of its opinion  to explaining why,  despite cases  like
Hilton v. South Carolina  Public  Railways Commission, 502 U.S. 197, 204-05  (1991)  (hold-
ing that the  state  could  be  sued on  a federal Jones Act  claim  in  state  court  even
though the suit was barred in federal court by the  11th Amendment),  and  Nevada v.
Hall,  440 U.S. 410, 418-21 (1979)  (rejecting the state's claim of immunity from suit in
a sister state court because the 11th Amendment does not apply other than in federal
court) the question  of state sovereign  immunity to federal claims in state  court was
still undecided.  See Alden, 119 S. Ct. 2257-60  (concluding, after distinguishing these
and other cases, that Congress's authority under Article  I to abrogate state immunity
from suit in its own  court is "a question of first impression").
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2.  Rule of Law and Supremacy of Federal Law
Alden's expansion of the states' constitutional immunity from suit
beyond  that established  in  prior  cases poses  threats  to  the  rule  of
law-by which I here mean the degree of certainty that there will be
effective, judicial enforcement  of applicable  legal norms.  It bears re-
membering that the phrase "government of laws not men" arose in a
case against a government  official.  The phrase  has come to have  at
least two  implications:  that judges will decide  cases  according to law
and not depending on the parties before them; and that the laws that
generally  apply will be  enforceable  against the government.  Under
Alden, the remedies that courts apply for violation of a large number
of federal laws  will vary depending  on the identity of the defendant
(and not the  content of the law); and the remedies available  against
private entities will not be available against state governments.41
Additionally, Alden is in tension with one of the pillars of federal
courts law,  Testa v. Katt.42  I focus here only on  Testa's conclusion that
a state may not, in its courts, discriminate against hearing claims over
which  the state courts  otherwise  have "jurisdiction adequate  and ap-
propriate under established local law"43 based upon the federal char-
acter  of  the  law  whose  enforcement  is  sought.  Here,  Maine  had
waived its immunity to suit in the state courts on state law minimum
wage claims against the State.44  As I understood  Testa before this case,
it would then have been clear that, since Maine had waived its immu-
nity for analogous claims in the state courts, the State was not free to
discriminate against the federal claims by barring its courts from hear-
ing them.  But now, absent "evidence  that the State has manipulated
its  immunity  in  a  systemic  fashion  to  discriminate  against  federal
causes of action," a state may limit its consent to suit to exclude cer-
41  It may be that this rule-of-law objection merges with the objection from justice.
Immunity rules are more generally in some tension with "rule of law" ideas as applied
to claims against governments and government officers, and I do not argue against all
immunity doctrines.  But I note this objection separately, for it is worth remembering
the costs of immunity doctrines, as well as their justifications.
42  330 U.S.  386  (1947).
43  Id. at 394.
44  See infra notes 160,  162 (quoting at length from the government's brief in Al-
den and from the Court's response to that argument).  Under Maine's minimum wage
law,  however,  public  employees  were  not entitled  to  increased  pay  for overtime
(which was the subject of the federal FLSA claim).  Maine argued that it was its ban on
overtime pay that was  most analogous to  the federal claim and that, since  the state
courts did not hear state overtime claims  against the state, its courts did not discrimi-
nate in refusing to hear the federal  overtime claim.  See Brief for Respondents at 8,
Alden  (No. 98-436).
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tain  claims based  on federal  law because  doing so is  "no more than
[an]  exercise  [of]  a privilege of sovereignty."45
3.  Devaluation  of the Role of Courts in the  System of Separation
of Powers
As I argue elsewhere at greater length, the Alden opinion is more
explicit than many in deprecating the value  ofjudicial decisions con-
cerning  government  behavior and judicial remedies  for that behav-
ior.46  The  Court  essentially  argues  that judicial  damages  awards
against the state are opposed to the ability of a people to self-govern. 47
Similar objections, however, apply to declaratoryjudgments  or injunc-
tive relief, which  can also  constrain legislative  choices.  The authority
and obligation  of courts  to decide  individual  claims under  national
laws validly enacted  for the benefit of the people derives  from basic
principles  of the supremacy of federal law, to which  the states agreed
when  they entered the  Union.  To suggest that judicial enforcement
of laws made by the people's representatives  is inconsistent with prin-
ciples of self-government  is fundamentally  pernicious and  disrespect-
ful  both  to  the  role  of  courts  and  to  the  role  of  the  people's
representatives  in the national  legislature.
4.  Pretense About Precedent
The logic of Alden is that the older precedents at best leave open
whether  states  can  assert  sovereign  immunity  in  their  own  courts
against federal statutory  claims and that the  reasoning and result in
Seminole Tribe require a similar rule in Alden.4 8  Seminole Tribe held that
the Eleventh Amendment precludes  Congress from abrogating states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal courts.  The Al-
den Court, while agreeing that the Eleventh Amendment does not ap-
ply  in  state  courts,  nonetheless  concludes  that  it  would  be
constitutionally anomalous  for state  courts  to  be compelled  to  hear
claims against states that federal courts could not hear.  But the Court
reaches this conclusion  only by assuming that, from the point of view
of state sovereignty,  there is no significant difference  between  a fed-
45  Alden, 119  S. Ct. at 2268;  see also infra text accompanying  notes 160-61.
46  See Jackson, supra note  1.
47  See Alden, 119 S.  Ct. at 2264.
48  See id. at 2255-60, 2266 ("We are aware of no constitutional precept that would
admit of a congressional  power to require state courts to entertain federal suits which
are not within the judicial  power of the United States ....  .").  Note too that Seminole
Tribe and the 11th Amendment are the first authorities cited in the Court's reasoning
in  Alden.  See 119  S.  Ct. at 2246-47.
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eral  and a state  court entertaining  an action against the state.  And
this assumption can only be sustained by ignoring a line of cases that
proceed on the opposite assumption-that is, that it is more deferen-
tial to  state sovereignty  for state  courts  to hear and resolve  federal
claims against the states than for federal courts to do so.49  Indeed, in
the Term after  Seminole Tribe, two members of the  Seminole Tribe and
Alden majorities, Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist, so  ar-
gued  to support their claim  that if state  courts were  open, even  Ex
parte Young actions should not be permitted in federal  court. 50  Only
by pretending that these conflicting lines of authority had no bearing
could  the majority argue  that precedent  and history compelled  the
result it reached.
51
49  SeeJackson,  supra note 1.
50  See  Idaho  v.  Coeur  d'Alene  Tribe,  521  U.S.  261,  274  (1997)  (Kennedy, J.,
joined by Rehnquist, CJ.).
51  The Court's fundamental argument-that  sovereign immunity was an impor-
tant constitutional principle, implicit in the original  Constitution, and reflected (but
not created)  by  the  l1th Amendment-is  inconsistent  with  older  cases predating
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).  For 19th  century  cases reflecting the  assump-
tion  that federal  courts  could  exercise jurisdiction  over actions  by diverse  citizens
against states until ratification of the 11th Amendment, see  United States v. Louisiana,
123  U.S.  32,  35  (1887)  (describing Article  III's  listings  of heads  of jurisdiction  as
"modified by the Eleventh Amendment"),  New Hampshire v. Lousiana,  108 U.S. 76, 91
(1883)  (holding that one state  could not sue another  on behalf of its citizens  and
reasoning that "[u]nder the Constitution, as it was originally construed,  a citizen of
one State could sue another State in the courts of the United States for himself," that
there was thus "no necessity for power in his State to sue in his behalf," and that it was
not "the intention of the framers of the Constitution to allow both remedies in such a
case;" "the giving of the direct remedy to the citizen himself was equivalent to taking
away any indirect remedy he might otherwise have claimed, through the intervention
of his State, upon any principle of the law of nations.  It follows that when the amend-
ment took away the special remedy there was  no other left"),  Briscoe v. Bank of Ken-
tucky, 36 U.S.  (11  Pet.)  257, 285  (1837)  (argument of counsel)  (assuming that at the
founding states could be sued  by  diverse  citizens but not their own),  id  at 327-28
(Thompson, J., concurring)  (making same assumption),  and Fletcher  v. Peck  10 U.S.
(6 Cranch) 87, 139  (1810)  (Marshall, CJ.) (alluding to a difference between the Con-
stitution  as passed and after the 11th Amendment was ratified).  See also Hans, 134
U.S. at 21  (1890)  (Harlan, J., concurring)  (disagreeing with the Court's implications
that  Chisholm v.  Georgia, 2 U.S.  (2 Dall.)  419  (1793),  had been incorrectly  decided).
On the Court's reasoning in Seminole Tribe, these older cases would be better evidence
of correct readings of the Constitution than  Hans.  See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S.  at 69
(suggesting that Hanss  analysis of the original understandings of the Constitution was
superior to that ofJustice Souter's dissent because the Hans Court was closer in time
to original events).
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D.  Scholarship and Stare Decisis
Stare  decisis  plays  an  important  and  valuable  role  in  constitu-
tional adjudication.  It provides a reason for courts to try to account to
and for past decisions and thus reinforces both reason-giving and sta-
bility.52  But I do not believe that  Seminole Tribe--which led to Alden's
expansive view of constitutional sovereign immunity in the state courts
and  has contributed  to the  Court's restrictive  interpretations  of the
Fourteenth  Amendment-is  yet  entitled  to  be  treated  as  "stare
decisis."
First,  Seminole  Tribe was  clearly  wrongly  decided. 53  As  argued
above,  moreover,  Alden was  incorrect,  especially  in light of Seminole
Tribe, 54 and the Florida  Prepaid  cases contain grievous errors of consti-
52  But see,  e.g., Jonathan  R. Macey,  The Internal and External Costs and Benefits  of
Stare  Decisis, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 93,  111  (1989)  (suggesting that stare decisis "permits
judges  to free-ride"  on  earlier efforts  by other judges and thus "avoid the extremely
difficult task of constructing" law).  In contrast to those who criticize stare  decisis  as
encouraging  a kind of judicial mindlessness,  I see it instead  as a doctrine that rein-
forces what I would call procedures for accountability in judicial decisionmaking.
53  For  critical  commentary  on  Seminole  Tibe, see  Vicki  C. Jackson,  Seminole
Tribe, the Eleventh Amendment and the Potential  Evisceration  of Ex parte Young, 72 N.Y.U.
L. REv.  495 (1997),  DanielJ. Meltzer,  The Seminole Decision and State Sovereign Immu-
nity,  1996  Sup.  CT.  REV.  1, and Henry Paul Monaghan,  Comment: The Sovereign Immu-
nity  "Exception," 110  HARV.  L. REV.  102,  121,  133  (1996)  (suggesting that the Court
"rejected clear constitutional text in preference to unarticulated and debatable histor-
ical explanations because of the power of symbolism,  thus perpetuating a questiona-
ble doctrine").  For critique  from a separation of powers  point of view, see  Laura S.
Fitzgerald,  Beyond Marbury:Jurisdictional  Self-Dealing in Seminole Tribe,  52 VAND.  L.
REV.  407  (1999).  Not all  scholarship  has been  so disapproving.  See,  e.g.,  David  P.
Currie, Ex parte Young  after Seminole Tribe, 72 N.Y.U.  L. REV.  547  (1997);  Richard
H. Seamon,  The Sovereign Immunity of States in Their Own  Courts, 37  BRANDEis  L.J. 319
(1998); John  C.  Yoo,  The Judicial  Safeguards of Federalism, 70  S.  CAL.  L.  REV.  1311
(1997).  Fortunately,  Seminole  Tribe has  not deterred  legal scholars  from  pursuing
deeper historical understandings of the  l1th Amendment.  SeeJames E. Pfander, His-
tory and State Suability: An  "Explanatory"  Account of the Eleventh Amendment, 83 CORNELL
L. REV.  1269  (1998).
54  Query: If Seminole Tribe had been correctly decided (to uphold federal jurisdic-
tion over federal statutory claims against states where Congress speaks clearly and has
substantive  legislative  power),  would  state  courts  have to  hear federal claims  whose
state law analogues  are  barred  by state sovereign  immunity?  Absent  discriminatory
applications  of state sovereign  immunity  law, must a state court entertain  a federal
cause of action against a state when the federal courts are open to it?  One could read
the  Supremacy  Clause  to  require  this  result,  especially in  light of the  Madisonian
Compromise which, as conventionally understood, does not require creation of infer-
ior federal  courts.  But one might also  reason  that, so long  as  the availability  of a
federal forum permits holding  governments  accountable  to law and vindicating the
supremacy of federal law, the interests of states in controlling the jurisdiction of their
own judiciaries would be stronger than any need to require a state court withoutjuris-
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tutional  reasoning.  A basic  requisite for  the inapplicability  of stare
decisis  has  to  be  that the  prior  decision  was  wrong-and  not just
wrong, but substantially wrong.  This standard is met. Next,  Seminole
Tribe and  its  progeny  have  all  been  closely  divided,  5-4  decisions.
Third,  Seminole Tribe and its progeny have  had to overrule  past deci-
sions themselves.  While the decisions they overruled-Pennsylvania  v.
Union Gas55 and Parden  v. Terminal  Railway56-were  also 5-4 decisions,
the  inconsistencies  in  results  are  hallmarks  of the  kind of constitu-
tional decisions  that cannot yet be regarded  as settled into the warp
and woof of constitutional law.  Finally, Seminole Tribe and its progeny
are  quite recent, and it is hard to see how-consistent  with the  de-
mands of the Supremacy Clause-states could legitimately, given the
Court's reasoning,  rely on them to their detriment: The Court's the-
ory is that the state's "good faith"57 and the possibility  of federal gov-
ernment suits to recover damages, plus injunction actions, will induce
states to comply with federal law.58  If the Court is not being disingen-
uous  in arguing that there are  ample means  to assure  state compli-
diction  over analogous state  law claims  to hear federal  claims  against the state.  Cf
Martinez v. California, 444 U.S.  277, 282  (1980)  (balancing the "[s]tate's interest in
fashioning its own rules of tort law"  against the "discernible federal interest"  in due
process to uphold the constitutionality of state sovereign immunity bar to state wrong-
ful death claim).  Under those  hypothetical  circumstances, the federal system might
be adequately protected through the discrimination prong of Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S.
386  (1947).  In  light of  Seminole Tribe, however  (and in  light of Maine's waiver  of
immunity to  state  minimum  wage  claims),  I  believe  that the  decision  in Alden  is
unsupportable.
As a matter of the policies ofjudicia  federalism, much can be said in favor of any
of three regimes:  (1) a regime that permits federal courts, but does not require state
courts, to hear claims against their states;  (2)  a regime that forbids federal courts, but
requires state courts, to hear such claims; and (3)  a regime that both permits federal
courts and requires state courts to hear such claims.  For a brief discussion, see Vicki
C. Jackson,  The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity, 98
YALE L.J.  1, 73-74, 86-88 & nn.347, 349  (1988)  (discussing the idea of complementar-
ity ofjurisdiction).  What is insupportable,  however, is the regime we presently have,
in which federal courts are prohibited to hear such claims and state courts are free to
deny jurisdiction  as  well.  For a  related  discussion,  see  Meltzer,  supra note  12,  at
1035-37.
55  481  U.S.  1 (1989).
56  377 U.S.  184  (1964).
57  Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2266; see also Forida  Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2209 n.9 (implying
that the possibility of a private bill from the legislature was relevant to the due process
analysis).
58  See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2266-68.
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ance with federal law,59 then what legitimate "reliance" interest would
states  have in  the  ruling?
60
The Supreme Court has spoken, and the lower courts are clearly
bound by its current interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, sov-
ereign immunity under the Constitution, and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.  But members  of the Court, and scholars who  comment on its
decisions,  have  a  choice  to make.  When  a  line of decisions  is  this
wrong, this recent, and this closely  divided, scholars who believe  the
decision  is wrong should call for its reversal, and Justices who believe
it is wrong are justified in so insisting in subsequent decisions. 61  The
role of scholars, here, is of some potential importance.  Notwithstand-
ing the Court's occasionally expressed  disdain for the value of schol-
arly comment,6 2  in evaluating whether a case has become  a basic part
of the legal landscape for purposes of deciding the stare decisis value
it  should be accorded,  the  views  of the  legal community-including
the views of scholars-should be of some weight.63  Scholarship often
has as its function  the rationalization  of the Court's decisions,  an ef-
59  Cf Meltzer, supra note  12, at 1023  (noting tension between  the Court's argu-
ments that federal  enforcement will not suffer and that private suits are  particularly
intrusive).
60  Cf Payne v. Tennessee,  501  U.S. 808, 828-30  (1991)  (arguing that stare decisis
should play a smaller role where issues are ones of procedure).  Presumably the Court
assumes that primary conduct is less likely  to be influenced by such considerations.
Under the other Payne factors advanced by ChiefJustice  Rehnquist, neither  Seminole
Tribe nor Alden should yet be given  stare decisis  effect,  considering  the amount of
controversy within  the Court and the  closeness of all these  decisions "over spirited
dissents challenging  the basic  underpinnings  of those decisions."  Id. at 829.
61  I  advanced  this argument  in  1997,  see Jackson,  supra note  53,  at 544-45  &
n.177, and again on January  8,  2000, at the AALS Federal Courts panel.  Three days
later the Court  issued its decision  in  Kimel v. Florida  Board of Regents, 120 S.  Ct. 631
(2000).  Justice Stevens, writing for four dissenters,  asserted that it would be wrong to
accord stare decisis effect to Seminole Tribe and its progeny.  See id. at 653.  I agree with
the dissenters.
62  See, e.g.,  Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 68  (noting that Justice Souter's dissent was
"cobbled together" from nothing more  than law journal articles).
63  See Ruth  Bader  Ginsburg,  Informing the Public About  the  U.S. Supreme  Court's
Work,  29  Loy. U.  CHI.  L.J.  275,  283  (1998)  (asserting  that most judges  read "legal
commentaries  and  law reviews"  for "enlightenment on  decisions, past, present and
future");  see  also Learned  Hand,  Have the Bench and Bar Anything to Contribute to  the
Teaching of Law?, 24 MICH.  L.  REV.  466,  480  (1926)  (arguing that law  teacher  and
judge are  "necessary  to the other  [and that]  each  must understand, respect and re-
gard the other, or both will fail");  cf.  MARY ANN  GLENDON  ET AL.,  COMPARATIVE  LEGAL
TRADrrIONS:  TEXT,  MATERIALs  AND  CASEs  209  (2d  ed.  1994)  (describing  the role of
legal scholarship  as a form of doctrinal  authority in civil  law systems and noting that
"learned writing" exerts most influence where the law is unsettled and where learned
writing is in consensus, sometimes even prompting abandonment of prior decisions).
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fort  to identify its theory, and determine  what, as a matter of coher-
ence, will follow, with the implicit normative  goal of supporting and
helping to construct coherence. 64  It is my plea here that those schol-
ars whose independent judgment on the underlying merits is that the
Court is wrong not yet turn to the rationalizing phase of our work, but
resist, and condemn, in the hope of developing a more just and more
constitutionally justifiable basic framework.
I.  OF  HISTORY,  FORUMS,  OLD AND  NEW  PROPERTY, AND  REMEDIAL
HiERARciv-.  SoME  COMMENTs  ON PRoFEssoRs  VAZQUEZ'S
AND WOOLHANDLER'S  ARTICLES
It is  common ground for Professors  Vzquez and Woolhandler
that the Court is engaged in an effort to find the proper balance be-
tween  competing constitutional  aspirations-to  recognize  the sover-
eign  immunity  of  the  states,  on  the  one  hand,  and  to  afford
appropriate  remedies  to secure governmental  accountability,  on the
other. Their articles also find common ground in the perceived rela-
tionship  between  individual  government  official  liability  traditions
and the developing shape of state sovereign immunity law.  Woolhan-
dler argues that the Court's apparent exceptions-for takings of prop-
erty and for refund of taxes  (as to which the Court has held that due
process  requires a remedy)-to the general rule  of sovereign  immu-
nity for states  correspond  to an  "individual  liability" model.  In this
sense,  she  and Vzquez  are  quite  close in  reading  the  Court's  due
process cases requiring states to provide taxpayer refunds  (as a matter
64  Professor Vdzquez's work  can be seen  to  raise  a tension between  coherence
and justice as constitutional aspirations.  SeeV  zquez, supra note 22, at 1692, 1777-90
(arguing  that jurisprudence  on  due  process,  sovereign  immunity,  and  the  lth
Amendment  can  be  rendered  coherent  by understanding  that constitutionally  re-
quired remedies  are against individuals, be those Ex parte Young actions or damages
actions, and that states have choices whether to indemnify or substitute themselves as
parties for the  officers).  In  that piece,  he advances  interpretations  of the  Court's
decisions to make more "coherent" the Seminole Tribe and McKesson Corp. v. Division  of
Alcoholic Beverages &  Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18  (1990),  decisions, one being that states pos-
sess a constitutional immunity from suit but that the Constitution requires that reme-
dies be available against state officers, possibly without regard  to official immunities.
See Vdzquez,  supra note 22, at 1805.  I would agree that if individual liability of state
officials were expanded and the protections of the "clearly established" law rule loos-
ened, rule of law concerns raised by expansions of immunity would be mitigated, and
greater coherence in formal doctrine might be obtainable.  But the likelihood of Con-
gress, or the Court, insisting on such strict personal liability seems remote; and adop-
tion of the immunity justifying theory may simply result in an overall contraction  of
the availability  of individual  redress  to victims of government wrongdoing.  For fur-
ther discussion, see  infra text accompanying notes  115-23.
200o1NOTRE  DAME  LAW  REVIEW[
of  due  process)  as  implying  an  individual  officer  liability  model.
Woolhandler treats the Court's decisions as perhaps implicitly assum-
ing  this,65 and  VWzquez  treats  the  Court  as perhaps  unaware  of the
tensions in its due process and sovereign immunity doctrines. 66  But in
the end, both seek to rationalize the Court's apparently clear holdings
that states must provide those remedies as resulting from or leading to
a model of individual liability, with the state having the power volunta-
rily to substitute itself as the remediator in a scheme of long-standing
protection  of property interests.
Woolhandler's approach  is largely historical:  she claims  that it is
consistent with history-in the sense of  judicial precedents-to  treat
states  as  being  immune  from  suit for  damages  on  "new  property"
claims,  and  she  claims  that  by  and  large  the  Court's  new jurispru-
dence  is consistent with this history and is justified by a set of charac-
teristics  that distinguish  new  and  old  property  claims  that support
following the historical model.67  While  I  agree that nineteenth-cen-
tury precedents support the view that sovereign immunity of state and
federal governments  is a part of the remedial tradition, that tradition
does not fully answer the question of the constitutionality of congres-
sional abrogation of immunity on federal causes of action.  I also disa-
gree  with  her  argument  that  the  Court's  approach  conforms  to
distinctions  between  new and old property  and with  her normative
defense  of distinguishing between new and old property for purposes
of sovereign  immunity  doctrine.  Instead,  I  will  suggest,  Woolhan-
dler's normative arguments would support recognition of only limited
forms of monetary relief in actions against sovereign governments and
would justify constitutional  doctrine  protecting  constitutional  sover-
eigns from unlimited exposures  to all of the elements of damages re-
covery that may exist in ordinary tort actions, but they do not support
what  the Court has found-that  is,  a constitutionally  prescribed  im-
munity from suit.
Vdzquez's approach, by contrast, is grounded less in the values of
historical practices  and more in the value  of coherence  in constitu-
tional  interpretation.  His  description  of the logical  implications  of
the Court's developing positions in its sovereign  immunity and Elev-
enth Amendment case law is analytically very helpful, as is his rule-of-
65  SeeWoolhandler, supra  note 8, at 920 (noting that the "Court has stuck close to
an  individual  liability  model  even  when  it  has  permitted  abrogation  of  state
immunity").
66  See Carlos Manuel Vfzquez,  Sovereign Immunity, Due Process, and the Alden  Tril-
ogy,  109 YALE LJ (forthcoming June 2000);  see also Vlzquez, supra note 7 at 860-61.
67  See Woolhandler, supra note 8, at 932-51.
[VOL-  75:3PRINCIPLE AND  COMPROMISE
law critique of the complexity of the current doctrine. 6 8  But his spec-
ulation  that the  Court may be  moving  towards  a position  in which
abrogation under the Fourteenth Amendment is never possible is less
convincing,69 and I will question how we should understand  the lan-
guage  on which V5.zquez  relies in speculating  to  this  effect.  I also
question  his  argument  that  the scope  of officers'  immunities  (i.e.,
qualified  immunity)  should  be  "constitutionalized"  and  attribute
some of its apparent appeal to the allure of coherence with decisions
(including  Seminole  Tribe and Alden)  that I think are  fundamentally
wrong.  On his  concerns  for coherence  in  the  law  (which I in  some
measure  share),  I have argued above that as  scholars we should not
necessarily value  coherence  over justice and must therefore  be con-
cerned  with  the  question  of what understandings  of the  Constitu-
tion-among those that are supportable by conventional methods  of
understanding-will  best  advance justice,  as  well  as  other  constitu-
tional values.
A.  History, Forum Allocation, and Remedial Preferences
Professor  Woolhandler  argues  that  the  Court  has  properly  re-
jected the "forum allocation"  view of the Eleventh Amendment, that
as a  descriptive  matter the Court's  sovereign  immunity cases  draw a
distinction between old property and new property for remedial pur-
poses, and that as a normative matter this makes sense.  While I agree
that the Court has rejected the forum allocation view, the Court's em-
phasis on the availability of state court remedies as limiting Congress's
Section 5 powers could end up having some of that effect, as Professor
Vizquez's  article  suggests.  Moreover,  whether  a  "forum allocation"
view  is  or  is  not  supported  by  history  depends  in  some  part  on
whether one focuses on the nineteenth or twentieth-century  cases.  As
to  the  coherence  and  legitimacy  of the  distinctions  between  those
cases in which Congress, or the Court, can require states themselves to
provide monetary remedies and those in which it cannot, I am unper-
suaded  that the Court's current  doctrine is  coherent with history or
that it is normatively justified by the factors Woolhandler propounds.
I question the constitutional theory of interpretation by which Wool-
handler proceeds,  resting as it  does almost entirely on historic prac-
tices; I find that as a descriptive matter the historic justification of the
Court's  current  distinctions  in  remedies  is  incomplete,  and on  the
normative front, Woolhandler's concerns about protecting states from
68  See Vf.zquez,  supra note  66.
69  See Vgzquez,  supra note  7, at 893-900.
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difficult-to-predict damages awards would support more narrow reme-
dial limitations  than those currently  in place.
1.  History and Constitutional Interpretation
A key question is why we should assume that the system of reme-
dies extent in the nineteenth century defines what we should under-
stand the Constitution to  require, or to prohibit, by way of remedies
against states.  Assuming that at the time of the framing remedies were
clearly established for unconstitutional  takings and for improper taxa-
tion, and for little else, why should this provide the guiding principle
for today determining what counts  as "property" and what process is
due?70  Further, even if one concluded that as a general matter, origi-
nal understandings  should be  the  principal  guide  to  interpretation,
other  features  of  the  legal  framework  may  have  so  dramatically
changed that it  becomes  unconvincing  to rely  entirely on originalist
approaches  to resolve  the remedial  issues addressed  in recent cases.
Those  changes include  (i)  expanded understandings  of the constitu-
tional  powers  of the  national government  (to include, for example,
the  power  to  require  states  to  "pre-clear"  changes  in voting  proce-
dures and the power to impose minimum wage laws on state employ-
ees);  (ii)  expansion  of the  policies  of both levels  of governments  to
include a range of activities that compete with activities in the market,
as is illustrated by the facts in the Florida  Prepaid  cases;  (iii)  expansion
of the immunities from retroactive  relief available  to government of-
ficers from common law origins of strict liability to current notions of
highly constrained possibilities for individual recovery against govern-
ment officers;71  and  (iv)  limitations  on the  availability  of injunctive
70  Professor Woolhandler's  analysis  does not explicitly distinguish  between  cases
decided before and after the ratification of the 14th Amendment; yet one might think
that if the courts were faithfully interpreting that Amendment,  one would see some
difference  in the pre and post-ratification  cases that would  be relevant.
71  Both Vdzquez  and Woolhandler  downplay the importance  of "good faith" or
qualified immunity defenses in  their modem  form in  evaluating the role of history.
In its modem form the "qualified immunity" defense allows bad faith behavior  to be
immunized that, under older formulations  apparently would not have been.  Compare
Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S.  (2 Cranch) 170 (1804)  (holding that a ship captain was liable
for damages in carrying out a presidential order that exceeded statutory authorization
even  though the ship captain acted in good faith),  with Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S.
511  (1985)  (ruling that although an Attorney General  did not have authority to au-
thorize the conduct of warrantless  search, he was immune from damages because his
lack of authority was not "clearly established"),  and Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
635  (1987)  (holding that although the right to be free from warrantless searches ab-
sent exigent  circumstances  and probable  cause was  clearly  established,  the relevant
question for  immunity of police  officer sued for warrantless  search was whether in
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relief against government officers.72  Many years ago Professor Jaffe's
historic study of sovereign  immunity in England concluded  that the
doctrine functioned less as an immunity and more as a way of defining
the procedures  by which  remedies  could be had. 7 3  If  that is histori-
cally correct, then surely changes in the availability of other remedies
for official wrongdoing  should bear  on  the continued  relevance  of
historic forms of sovereign immunity.
Having said that, however, let me also agree with Professor Wool-
handler  that, in  the  construction  of the jurisdiction of the  federal
courts,  history and tradition do have  a significant role  to play.  It is
history alone that can account  for some  significant departures  from
coherent,  principled  decisiomnaking.7 4  As  the  work  of Professors
Woolhandler,  Fallon,  Strauss, and others might be taken to suggest,
maintenance of historical tensions in doctrine can be justified in part
because  of the stability  that adherence  to historical  understandings
promotes and in part because the Constitution consists of competing
aspirations  that will inevitably  have to be compromised in part in or-
der to be sustained at the same time as their competitors  (and history
is one plausible way to reach such a balance).75
Yet, to assume history is the sole guide on questions of how sover-
eign immunity affects Congress's power to create causes of action en-
forceable against states is to ignore the lessons of history itself. One of
the cases highlighted in Professor Woolhandler's  superb historical ac-
light of particular facts a reasonable officer could have believed the search to be con-
stitutional)  (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald,  457  U.S. 800,  819  (1982)).  And while  the
Court's modem reformulation of the doctrine of official immunities might be under-
stood to be aimed at maximizing appropriate levels of deterrence,  seeV~zquez,  supra
note 7, at 877-79, neither VWzquez nor Woolhandler  considers whether the doctrine
is so inadequate in providing compensation or vindication of plaintiffs'  interests that
it fails  to fulfill the goals  of a remedial  system  (with consequent  adverse  effects  on
citizens' trust of their government).
72  Compare City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S.  95  (1983)  (holding that a per-
son  who had been  subject to  a  choke hold lacked  standing  to seek  an injunction
against future use of choke holds by the police),  with Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802
(1974)  (affirming the grant of an injunction against certain abusive police practices).
73  See Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77
HARv. L. REv.  1 (1963).
74  See,  e.g., Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,
68 n.20  (1982)  (plurality)  (Brennan, J.)  (stating that the rationale for public  rights
cases  lies "not in political  theory, but rather in Congress's  and the  Court's under-
standing of what power was reserved to the  Judiciary by the Constitution as a matter of
historical fact").
75  See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional  Inter-
pretation, 100 HRAv. L. Ruv. 1189  (1987);  David A.  Strauss,  Common Law Constitutional
Interpretation,  63 U. CHI.  L. Rxv. 877  (1996); Woolhandler,  supra note 8, at 919.
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count  of  constitutionally  compelled  remedies,  Burrill v.  Locomobile
Co.,76  includes  this assertion by Justice Holmes, writing for the Court:
The Constitution  standing  alone without  more  does  not  create  a
paramount unchangeable  liability to an action of tort on the part of
all persons who may take part in enforcing a state law that it invali-
dates.  It leaves the remedies  to Congress and the States. 77
In evaluating  what remedies  Congress can impose, then, at least one
important voice in history insists  on a substantial  role for Congress.
2.  What Does History Show?
My second point follows from this  discussion:  the  historical rec-
ord is  in fact more  ambiguous than Woolhandler's  treatment in  this
Article allows.  Let me consider first the argument concerning the "fo-
rum allocation" view of the Amendment.
a.  Forum Allocation?
Alden plainly rejects a view of state sovereign immunity as consti-
tutionally protected  by  understanding  the Eleventh  Amendment  as
having a "forum allocation" function, under which cases barred from
being  initiated in  federal court would be adjudicated  in state  court
and subject to  Supreme  Court review.  Under  Alden, it  is up  to  the
states, rather than to federal law, whether the state courts must enter-
tain such  actions.  To the extent that the standards for waiver  of im-
munity  to  suit in  state  courts  are  less  stringent  than  for waiver  in
federal courts,  the  Eleventh  Amendment  will  still function  in some
respects  as  a forum allocation principle-what  I shall refer to as  the
"weak" forum  allocation  principle.  But  the  claim  that  state  courts
must hear cases against states arising under otherwise valid federal law
has, for the time, been rejected.
Woolhandler's  argument-that  the strong version  of the forum
allocation  view,  which would  treat  states  as  obligated  to  hear  cases
barred from federal courts by the Eleventh Amendment, is historically
insupportable-is  incomplete  in  the sources  on which  it  draws  and
thus  reaches  a conclusion  that  is not fully persuasive.  It  is,  I  think,
correct to point out-as Woolhandler  has so well shown 78-that  the
nineteenth-century cases seemed  to treat immunity issues in  cases in-
76  258 U.S. 34  (1922).  Burill  is discussed in Ann Woolhandler,  The Common Law
Origins of Constitutionally Compelled Remedies, 107 YAIE  L.J.  77, 138-44  (1997).
77  Burrill,  258 U.S. at 38.
78  See Woolhandler,  supra  note 8, at 921-24;  see also Woolhandler,  supra  note 76,
at 148-62.
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volving federal questions with some  degree of similarity whether  the
case arose initially in the state or the federal courts.  Indeed,  Cohens v.
Virginia, 79 a case frequently cited for the proposition that the Eleventh
Amendment  does  not apply  on  appeals  from  state  court  decisions,
rests far more clearly on two other propositions: first, that in its essen-
tial posture the case was not one against a state but by a state against
private  persons  as criminal  defendants and, in that posture,  did not
come within  the  bar of the Amendment;  and second,  that federal
question jurisdiction  was invoked  (by a citizen against his own state)
rather than a party-based head of  jurisdiction.80
But, it does not follow from this nineteenth-century practice that
the  subsequent  development  of the  "forum allocation"  view  of the
Eleventh  Amendment's  effect,  which was  manifested in the  Court's
more recent decisions until Alden,81 is unsupported by history.  Rather
it depends on what counts as history.  For by 1900, the Court had in-
troduced the concept  that a state could be subject to suit in its own
courts, on federal claims,  even when it was not subject to suit in the
federal courts.8 2  This issue initially arose in the context of waivers  of
immunity, the Court holding that waivers  of immunity to be sued in
state  courts  would  not  ipso  facto  extend  to  being  sued  in  federal
court.  Yet the Court at the same time made clear that the state could
not condition  its consent to being sued in state  courts  so as  to  pre-
clude  Supreme Court review  of its decision of federal issues.8 3
Woolhandler  suggests  that this federal  limitation  on  the state's
power to limit its consent can be understood by reference  to the need
to have  the Supreme Court resolve federal issues  that are decided in
79  19 U.S.  (6 Wheat.)  264  (1821).  For a detailed discussion,  see Jackson,  supra
note 54, at 13-25.
80  That sovereign  immunity  issues were  treated  similarly  by the  Court in both
state and federal court cases involving federal claims, as Woolhandler suggests, would
not be inconsistent with the "diversity repeal" view of the 1lth Amendment that I and
others have argued for.  If sovereign  immunity is recognized  as a common law doc-
trine, it would not be surprising at all that federal and state courts in the 19th century
would come to similar conclusions.  And if the 11th Amendment were understood to
repeal heads ofjurisdiction based on party status, it would be irrelevant to Congress's
powers to abrogate  common law immunities to vindicate federal law in federal ques-
tion cases.  SeeJackson,  supra note  53, at 39-104;  see also Seminole Tribe, 517  U.S. at
130-59 (Souter, J., dissenting);  id. at 82-95 (Stevens, J.,  dissenting).
81  See Hilton  v.  South Carolina  Pub.  Ry.  Comm'n,  502  U.S.  197  (1991);  Atas-
cadero  State  Hosp. v. Scanlon,  473  U.S.  234, 238-39  n.2  (1985);  see also Nevada v.
Hall, 440 U.S.  410  (1979).
82  See Smith v. Reeves,  178 U.S.  436  (1900).
83  See id. at 445.
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the state courts.8 4  This is not a sufficient explanation, for we tolerate
state courts deciding a variety of federal issues that cannot (because of
the presence  of an independent  and adequate  state  ground) be  re-
viewed in the Supreme Court.
8 5  Rather, as I have suggested at greater
length elsewhere,  the constructive,  conclusive "consent" to Supreme
Court review of state court judgments in  actions against states  arises
from the  Constitution itself and from the  states'  agreement  to that
Constitution. 8 6  And if the Constitution itself requires Supreme Court
review of state court judgments  against states when federal  law  is in-
volved, it surely provides some basis for the view that the Constitution
equally contemplates lower federal courtjurisdiction over states in liti-
gation involving federal questions.
To the extent that Woolhandler's  position implies that it would
make no difference to states whether they were sued in state or federal
court, moreover, the  position  is inconsistent with another important
strand of federal courts law.  Concomitant with the expansion of fed-
eral court jurisdiction  over federal  question cases  that began  in ear-
nest  after  1875,  the  Court  developed  doctrines  of  abstention,
designed to secure the role of state court systems in adjudicating cases
of interest to the states in their sovereign governmental capacities and
in preserving of the integrity of state judicial systems.8 7  Many of these
doctrines  are predicated  on the  assumption  that states  have  special
interests in adjudicating  in their own courts  claims close  to the heart
of state sovereignty, including tax claims.  As recently as  1997, Justice
Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist,  argued that there was  a
significant  difference,  from  a constitutional  perspective,  between  a
state court entertaining an action in essence against the state and the
same  action  proceeding in  federal  court.  While  they advanced  the
argument in  Idaho v.  Coeur dAlene Tribe, 88  they have withdrawn  it in
Alden-but this does not make it any the less consistent with a strand
of history in both sovereign  immunity and other abstention  cases.
Nonetheless, Woolhandler  is  correct in describing  the Court as
rejecting the "forum allocation" view of the Amendment.  As Professor
84  See Woolhandler,  supra note 8, at 924.
85  See,  e.g,  Michigan  v.  Long, 463  U.S.  1032,  1041  (1983);  Fox  Film  Corp.  v.
Muller, 296 U.S. 207,  210  (1935).
86  SeeJackson,  supra note 54, at 36-37.
87  See generally RIcHARD  H. FALLON, JR. ET AL.,  HART &  WECHSLER'S  THE FEDERAL
COURTS  AND  THE  FEDERAL  SYSrEM  1216-22,  1230-1308  (4th  ed.  1996)  (describing,
e.g., "Younger" abstention, Pullman abstention, Burford abstention, and the case law
relating to Tax Injunction  Act).
88  521  U.S. 261, 271-74  (1997)  (KennedyJ.,joined by Rehnquist, CJ.).  See gener-
ally supra text accompanying notes 48-51.
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V5,zquez  suggests,  however,  to  the extent that Congress's  powers  to
abrogate  states' immunities from suit are dependent on whether state
court remedies are provided, the functional effects of the "forum allo-
cation" view may well be reinforced.8 9  Alden also raises for the future
the question  whether, where  Congress  has power constitutionally to
abrogate  states'  Eleventh Amendment  immunity in federal  court,  it
likewise has power to abrogate states'  constitutional immunity in state
court.  Whether  the  concerns  that underlay  the  "forum allocation"
function of Eleventh Amendmentjurisprudence  will be invoked in ex-
amining that question may depend on how fully the Court has aban-
doned the anti-discrimination principle of Testa v. Katt,  9 0  discussed in
Part III.
b.  Old and New Property, History, and Sovereign  Immunity
Professor Woolhander is, I think, persuasive  in showing stronger
nineteenth-century  traditions for assuring federally enforceable judi-
cial  remedies  for  unconstitutional  takings  and  for  coerced  taxes
through  remedies  against state officers  than for affirmative  enforce-
ment of state contracts; historically, as she suggests, some of the mech-
anisms at common law for redress of takings or coerced taxes involved
analogies to actions against individual officers in trespass.91  But how
this bears on Congress's authority to treat invocation of sovereign im-
munity  as  a denial  of due  process  remains  unclear.92  Many of the
nineteenth-century  cases on which Woolhandler relies to support her
89  See Vfzquez,  supra note 66.
90  330 U.S. 386  (1947).
91  See Woolhandler,  supra note  8,  at  921-29;  Woolhandler,  supra note  76,  at
99-110,  135-37;  see also V~zquez,  supra note 22, at 1774-76  (emphasizing remedial
trends based on relief against state officers, though minimizing purported distinction
betveen contract and tort).  I am not yet persuaded by the argument that the Due
Process  Clause of the 14th Amendment could  always be satisfied with  relief against
officers.  The  14th Amendment is, after all, addressed  to the state itself; and the Due
Process Clause itself might well impose limits on the degree to which state law could
assign to its officers the financial responsibility of providing redress for harms caused
by a policy insisted on by the state itself.
92  Woolhandler appears to frame her discussion as follows:  Given the Court's rul-
ing in  Seminole Tribe, it is sensible for the Court to interpret the 14th Amendment in a
way that does not permit Congress simply to exercise the power to enforce  the Due
Process Clause as a basis for enforcing Article I rights against the states; to do other-
wise would be to allow circumvention  of the rule of Seminole Tribe. Professor Wool-
handler's argument, which others make as well, makes assumptions about the limited
breadth of the 14th Amendment that I believe should not pass unnoticed or unchal-
lenged-history may  teach  that the  14th Amendment, and especially the  Privileges
and  Immunities  Clause,  was  indeed  intended  to  have  a:  substantial  nationalizing
effect.
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claim for a constitutional basis for sovereign immunity were cases that
must be understood in the context of a world in which the sharp  dis-
tinctions between  federal and state law that characterize  the modern
consciousness had not emerged.93  While sovereign immunity was spo-
ken of as part of the jurisprudence  of civilized nations then,94 so too
was  the  federal  government's  authority to  exclude  from  citizenship
Chinese persons on account of their race in post-Fourteenth Amend-
ment decisions that the Court would not likely reach today.95  Earlier
cases, from the Marshall Court era, gave far more cautious interpreta-
tions both to the scope of the Eleventh Amendment and to the reach
93  As Woolhandler herself recognizes,  the boundaries  between state and federal
law were far less clearly articulated in older cases than today.  See Woolhandler, supra
note 76, at 108-11.
94  See,  e.g.,  Beers  v.  Arkansas,  61  U.S.  (20  How.)  527  (1857).  The  Court there
said,
It is an established principle ofjurisprudence  in all civilized nations that
the sovereign  cannot be sued in its own  courts, or in any other, without its
consent and permission; but it may, if it thinks proper, waive  this privilege,
and permit itself to be made a defendant  in a suit by individuals, or by an-
other State.  And as this permission is altogether voluntary on the part of the
sovereignty, it follows  that  it  may  prescribe  the  terms  and  conditions  on
which  it consents  to  be sued,  and the  manner in which  the  suit shall  be
conducted, and may withdraw its consent whenever it may suppose that jus-
tice to the public requires it.
Id. at 529.  Note that Beers's description  of sovereign  immunity departs substantially
from what  the modem Court has  said about the sovereign  immunity of the states:
First, states do not possess sovereign immunity with respect to claims by other states or
by  the United States.  Second,  they may not prescribe  the  terms and conditions  en-
tirely, since they cannot preclude Supreme  Court review of cases heard  in the state
courts.  For Woolhandler's treatment of Beers, see Woolhandler,  supra note 8, at 925
n.35,  and Woolhandler,  supra note 76, at 114 n.185.
95  See FongYue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S.  698, 700 n.1  (1893)  (upholding a
statute requiring the exclusion of persons of Chinese descent and requiring testimony
of "at least one credible  white  witness"  to establish  proof of entitlement  of Chinese
laborers  to remain in the country).  The majority of the Court asserted the "inherent
and  inalienable  right of every  sovereign  and independent nation" in support of its
conclusion.  Id. at 711.  Justices Brewer and Field argued in vigorous dissents that the
practice  of other nations or claims about inherent rights of sovereignty were irrele-
vant to the powers of this government under the Constitution.  See id. at 737  (Brewer,
J., dissenting);  i&L  at 757  (Field, J., dissenting).  Whatever power the federal govern-
ment today  would or would not have  to discriminate  based on race in immigration
and naturalization  policy, it surely would  lack power to  discriminate  based on race
among  those  whose  testimony  could  be  heard  on  disputed  questions  of fact.  See
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995)  (holding that any use of race
must meet compelling interest standard).
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of sovereign immunity.96  In  United States v. Lee,
9 7  the Court noted the
absence of any persuasive  constitutional justification for the doctrine
of sovereign immunity as applied to the federal government, though it
recognized its existence and gave it a narrow construction.  As Lee and
other  cases suggest, the nineteenth-century  history far more strongly
supports a view of sovereign  immunity as preventing suits directly to
recover contractual damages from or compel specific performance  of
contracts by states than it does the current rule that any suit against a
state  officer for  retrospective  relief is  deemed one  against the state
and generally barred by immunity.98
Recognizing that the nineteenth-century  cases suggest that sover-
eign  immunity was  a vibrant rule at least in  considering  affirmative
claims on contracts against states, I differ from Woolhandler in seeing
how this history relates  to the distinction between new and old prop-
erty.  She argues that the Court's recent trilogy drew the correct line
between old property and new property, indicating that, with respect
to old property, monetary remedies  must be provided  either against
the state or against its officers, but that for new property, it is appro-
96  See,  e.g.,  Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S.  (9 Wheat.)  738  (1824); Co-
hens v. Virginia, 19 U.S.  (6 Wheat.)  264  (1821).
97  106 U.S.  196,  204-08  (1882)  (noting that "the principle  [of sovereign  immu-
nity]  has  never been  discussed  or the reasons  for it given,  but it has  always  been
treated as an established doctrine").
98  On the Court's willingness to sustain sovereign immunity defenses on contracts
claims, see for example,  Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1  (1890)  (holding suit against
state  to recover amounts due on bonds barred by the 11th Amendment),  In re Ayers,
123 U.S.  443  (1887)  (holding suit against a state Attorney General  to "compel  the
specific performance" of bond contracts barred by 11th Amendment).  For contrast-
ing approaches  to other kinds of claims against sovereign  government officers, com-
pare Atchison Topeka & Santa  Fe Railway v. O'Connor,  223 U.S. 280  (1912)  (permitting
suit against a  state tax collector to  recover taxes  claimed to  violate the  Commerce
Clause which, according to state law, would be paid through a state auditor's 'warrant
for refunding of the tax"),  Poindexterv. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270 (1885)  (permitting suit
against  a state  officer to  recover property  seized  for failure  to pay  taxes when  the
state's insistence  on payment of taxes in a particular way itself violated the Contracts
Clause),  and  United States v. Lee, 106 U.S.  196  (1882)  (rejecting sovereign immunity
defense  in suit against  federal  army  officers  to  eject  them from  land purportedly
owned by the plaintiff),  with Breard  v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371  (1998)  (relying on the 11th
Amendment as an additional bar to federaljurisdiction  over suit against a state officer
to restrain  execution of foreign  national  following arrest in violation of Treaty and
subsequent conviction and death sentence),  Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521  U.S.  261
(1997)  (holding that the  11th Amendment barred suit against state  officers to pro-
hibit their use of submerged river beds in violation of tribe's claimed federal right of
ownership),  and Edelman  v. Jordan,  415  U.S.  651  (1974)  (holding  that the  11th
Amendment  barred suit against a state  officer  to recover past due welfare  benefits
under federal spending program).
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priate  to  provide  no  or fewer  remedies.99  But her argument  that a
distinction between old and new property explains the cases is simply
not persuasive  on  its  own  terms.  Nor  are her normative  arguments
persuasive  in establishing  the difference  between  new and old prop-
erty  as  corresponding  to justifications for when  sovereign  immunity
will or will not apply.
Professor  Woolhandler  seeks  to  support what  she  sees  as  the
Court's  distinguishing between  new and old property.  But I  do not
understand why Woolhandler  treats  patents  as  a form  of "old prop-
erty" and Lanham Act unfair competition claims as "new." 100  Both are
claims to protect interests whose  existence depends  on positive  gov-
ernment acts or statutes.  To be entitled to a patent, one must affirma-
tively  establish  one's  entitlement,  through  proof  of  originality,
usefulness,  non-obviousness,  and  priority  in  time. 0 1  A patent,  in
other words,  is a form of property entitlement that is statutory in ori-
gin,  not derivable from  the  interests  protected  by the  common  law
absent a statute.1 02  The distinctions Woolhandler relies  on, in short,
are distinctions in the historic types of remedies available for different
causes of action that do not necessarily correspond to the distinctions
between  "new" property and "old" property.
99  See Wooliandler,  supra note 8, at 921,  932-33, 940-42  (treating the Court as
distinguishing statutory from constitutional violations and as providing damages rem-
edies for old but not new property).  As Professor VSzquez argues, the Court did not
purport to be distinguishing between new and old property.  In  College Savings Bank it
said  that the  interests  protected  by the  Lanham Act were  not property  at  all.  See
VSizquez, supra  note 66.  It is unclear whether Professor Woolhandler's position is that
this  holding was  correct, and  accordingly  due  process requires  no remedy at all to
protect those  interests, or whether her position  is that what the Court should  have
said  is  that the Lanham Act interests  are a form of "new property" with  respect to
which the Due Process Clauses should be understood  to require fewer remedies  (e.g.,
only prospective  relief).  (Note too, that even for  old property, Professor Woolhan-
dler's  reading is  that the  Constitution does  not really  require remedies  against the
state but is satisfied with remedies against officers.  See Woolhandler,  supra note 8, at
929-32;  see also Woolhander, supra note 76, at 125 & n.244.)  The Court has indicated
that prospective  injunctive  relief against state officers  to enforce federal  law is gener-
ally  still available.  See, e.g.,  Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S.  at 71  n.14.  I am unsure whether
Professor Woolhandler would see this as resulting from the Supremacy Clause or the
Due Process Clause.
100  See generally V.zquez,  supra note 22,  at 1748  n.289 (arguing that efforts to dis-
tinguish  Lanham Act claims from interests  recognized as "property" is unpersuasive);
Vzquez, supra  note 66  (elaborating on this argument).  For Professor Woolhandler's
argument, see supra note 8, at 940-42.
101  See 35 U.S.C.  §§ 101-03  (1994).  See generally ERNEsT  BAINBRIDGE LIPSCOMB III,
LIPsCOMB'S  WALKER  ON  PATENTS (3d ed.  1991).
102  See id. at 35.
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If one is  to resort to history, moreover,  consider  the degree  to
which the older cases Woolhander has identified might well have sup-
ported  a different result in  modem Eleventh  Amendment cases like
Edelman v. Jordan. The older cases, for one thing, do sometimes turn
on small  matters  of pleading.  For  example,  in  Atchison,  Topeka  &?
Santa Fe Railway  v.  O'Connor, 0 3  discussed  by  Professor  Woolhan-
dler,1 0 4  the  Court upheld  federal  court jurisdiction  over  an  action
against  a  state  tax  collector  to recover  a  tax  claimed  to violate  the
Commerce Clause, rejecting the defendant's  challenge that the form
of action was not permitted under state law.  In considering this objec-
tion, the Court noted that whether the defendant, the Colorado Sec-
retary of State, had paid the money over to the state treasurer would
not affect jurisdiction, it  being "inconceivable  that the State should
attempt to hold him" and noting that state law "provided against any
difficulty in  which the Secretary of State otherwise might find himself
in case of a disputed tax," for it authorized the state auditor to "draw a
warrant  for  the  refunding  of the  tax"  in  the  event  of a judgment
against the Secretary  of State. 05  If  it were  the case that, except for
claims based  on  a state  contract, retroactive relief for governmental
wrongs could be granted against state officers,  regardless of whether
payment would come from the state treasury or from property in  the
hands of the state, "sovereign immunity" would be of far less concern;
judgment  could  have  been  entered  against  the  state  officer  in
Edelman. In  cases subsequent to  O'Connor,  however, virtually identical
actions were found barred in the federal courts by state sovereign im-
munity,  and  O'Connor was  recharacterized  as  involving  an  action
under  "general  law"  against  the  tax  collector  "personally." 0 6  This
twentieth-century  expansion  of the scope  of sovereign  immunity,  as
103  223 U.S.  280  (1912).
104  SeeWoolhandler, supra  note 76, at 136-37 &  n.300; Woolhandler, supra  note 8,
at 925-26.
105  O'Connor,  223 U.S. at 287.
106  Great N. Life  Ins. Co. v. Read,  322 U.S. 47, 50 (1944)  (distinguishing  Smith v.
Reeves, 178 U.S.  436, from  O'Connor  on grounds that Smith was instituted "against the
defendant 'as  Treasurer of the State of California'  to  recover taxes assessed  against
and paid," pursuant to a state statute that authorized "suit against the State Treasurer
for the recovery of taxes which were illegally exacted," while  O'Connorwas a suit "to
recover personally from a tax collector money wrongfully exacted by him under color
of state  law").  But like  the  state  statute  described  in  O'Connor,  the  California  law,
described in Smith, provided that "[i]f the final judgment was against the Treasurer,
the  Comptroller of the state was  directed to draw his warrant on state  funds for its
satisfaction."  Id at 50.  What was different, apparently, was the caption-whether the
defendant was sued "as Treasurer."  Cf  Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22  U.S. (9
Wheat.) 738  (1824)  (party of record rule).  But cf David P. Currie,  Sovereign Immunity
20oNOTRE  DAME  LAW  REVIEW[
noted above,  illustrates the fluidity of "historical" understandings  of
what remedies are constitutionally required, casting doubt on the reli-
ability and utility of Woolhandler's  descriptive  claim about what his-
tory establishes.
1 0 7
3.  Normative Arguments About Remedies
Woolhandler's  normative  arguments  proceed from  the assump-
tion  that "new" property  claims  are more  likely than  "old" property
claims to involve  the potential for large and difficult to predict dam-
ages  awards  unrelated  to  any  benefit  the  state  may  have  achieved
through  its  unlawful  conduct.  But  the  archetypal  modem  case
prohibiting  retroactive  relief against state  officials  involves  a factual
scenario  far afield from her concerns  about unlimited damages unre-
lated to the scope and nature of the state's violation of law and possi-
ble benefits  to  the  state from the  violation.  In Edelman v. Jordan, 0 8
the Court held as a matter of Eleventh Amendment  law (and in the
absence  of waiver  of immunity  through  "clear statement")  that if a
state  official is sued for payment of funds due a social welfare  recipi-
ent under a federal spending program, the state's immunity bars the
suit  against the  officer-even  though  the state  received  the  federal
grant subject to the conditions of the grant, including payment of the
assertedly past due amounts.1 09  If a state has received federal funds to
carry out a federal program  and falls  to pay third party beneficiaries
that to which they are entitled, should this be regarded  as analogous
to unjust enrichment?  Moreover, as Woolhandler  recognizes,11° tem-
porary "takings" of property may involve  no monetary enrichment of
the state at all, yet the Court requires payment of 'Just compensation"
and Suits Against  Government  Officers, 1984  Sup.  CT.  REV.  149,  167  (noting that  the
Constitution is not amended to  change captions on complaints).
107  While  Woolhandler's  descriptions  of cases  are  meticulously  careful,  it is her
effort  to cast  the more  recent  cases  as  resting on  remedial  assumptions similar  to
those of the 19th  Century cases that I find unpersuasive.
108  415 U.S.  651  (1974).
109  SeeJackson,  supra note  54, at 69 n.284.  My point here is that the distinction
between states  being able to  keep  (or expend for other purposes)  money that is in
some sense not theirs and pure "expectations" based claims  does not explain the dis-
tinctions in those  forms of relief against officers that will and will not be treated as
claims  against the state under the Court's current approach.  Edelman involved a fed-
erally funded "entitlement" program;  each individual's claim for past due payments  is
for discrete,  limited,  and  easy to  ascertain  amounts, and as  the lower court found,
could  readily  have  been  understood  as  a  claim  for  "restitution"  of benefits.  See
Weaver  v. Jordan,  472  F.2d 985,  993  (7th  Cir.  1973),  rev'd, 415  U.S.  651,  665-66
(1974).
110  Woolhandler, supra note 8, at 928 n.52.
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to the property owner.  In short, the distinction between restitutionary
claims based on unjust enrichment and "expectations" based damages
claims does not neatly track either the distinctions between "old" and
"new" property  nor  the  distinctions  drawn  in  the  Court's  Eleventh
Amendment and related sovereign  immunity law.
Woolhandler's normative arguments  against permitting damages
awards for difficult to predict "lost expectations"  as posing a greater
threat to state fiscal integrity than other forms of relief may have sub-
stantial merit.  States  are  not, after all,  like either private businesses
that must accept  the discipline  of the market and which  may disap-
pear as entities through bankruptcy  or merger, nor like  cities, coun-
ties,  or  other subdivisions  not guaranteed  constitutional  status  and
continuity  and  which  can  be  manipulated  or  abolished  by  the
states.11'  States  are required by the Constitution  to exist, in a form
capable of performing important government functions; the Constitu-
tion contemplates the "continued existence" of the states in a "perpet-
ual  Union."112  Without  attempting  a  response  to  Woolhander's
claims about corrective and distributive justice, let me simply proceed
on  the  basis  that there  may  be  sound  constitutional  reasons  to  be
more concerned about remedial  regimes that can result in the award
of unpredictable  and large  damages  awards  against constitutionally
sovereign  entities.  But even  assuming this  to  be  true, it would not
follow that all claims against states,  or all claims against state officers
for monetary relief that would be paid from the state treasury, should
be constitutionally barred.  The relief sought in Edelman v. Jordan,  for
example, was limited by federal law to readily calculable past due ben-
efits, as  is relief in other similar claims  to discrete "entitlement"  pay-
ments from  governments.  Thus,  some  of her normative  arguments
might well  support remedial  immunities for some  elements of dam-
ages awards, but they do not support the rules the Court has promul-
gated in the name of the Eleventh Amendment and the purportedly
constitutional principle of state sovereign immunity.
111  See Richard  Briffault,  "What About the  'Ism'"?  Normative and Formal Concerns in
Contemporary  Federalism, 47 VAND.  L. REv.  1303,  1336  (1994).
112  See Alden, 119  S.  Ct. at 2247  (noting "textual provisions  of the  Constitution
[that]  assume  the States'  continued existence  and active  participation  in the funda-
mental processes  of governance");  Texas  v.  White,  74  U.S.  (7 Wall.)  700,  725-26
(1868)  (noting the role of states  in the "perpetual union");  see also Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S.  898, 919  (1997); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S.  452,  457  (1991).  See
generally Jackson,  supra note  35,  at 2264-47.  The  first  Constitution  of the  United
States was denoted "Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union," and reference
to the "perpetual union" was common in the 19th century.  See, e.g., The  Civil Rights
Cases,  109  U.S. 3, 50-51  (1883)  (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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B.  Sovereign Immunity and Suits Against Officers: Of History, Coherence,
and Supremacy
Professor  Vzquez's  article  calls  our  attention  to  conflicting
strands in the Court's recent decisions.  On the one hand, he notes,
the Court treats state sovereign immunity as posing no significant bar
to the effective enforcement  of federal law against the states.  On this
view,  alternative  mechanisms  (including  Ex parte Young actions  and
other suits against officers, suits by the United States against the states,
and the good faith of the states)  will secure appropriate  compliance
with valid federal  law, and the  sovereign  immunity  of the state  is  a
formal,  almost vestigial  doctrine, having little functional  importance
given the possibility of damages awards against state officers which the
state  would  feel  practical  impulsions  to  indemnify  for. 11  On  the
other hand, he notes, the Court's more recent opinions herald a rela-
tively new note, one that he calls the "state sovereignty" strand, under
which the state's sovereign immunity is real and important, and must
influence interpretation of other parts of the Constitution-including
the Fourteenth Amendment-in  order to avoid being circumvented
or undermined.
1 14
Professor Vtzquez  argues  that, if what he  calls  the "state sover-
eignty" strand of the Court's recent cases  is to be taken seriously, its
logic requires  that officer immunities be regarded  as constitutionally
compelled  and  as  applicable  in  actions  against government  entities
that employ  officers.115  This  argument  may illustrate  the  risk that,
once one accepts that "state immunity" is an important constitutional
principle, "coherence" will carry one far down the path of precluding
individual  justice  and  limiting  the  scope  for  "rule  of  law"  and
"supremacy" concerns to operate.  Professor Vdzquez also  appears to
offer qualified  endorsement for constitutionalizing  officers'  immuni-
113  See Vfzquez,  supra note 7, at 863-88.  Note  that even on Vizquez's view of this
"supremacy" strain,  the current state of affairs imposes some "real" costs in terms of
actual  gaps in remedies,  see id. at 880,  that would  require multifold changes  in doc-
trine to fix.  Although Professor Vfizquez has been critical of the distinction between
contract and tort claims in this area, his emphasis on the remedy of suits against state
officers might not-absent change  in substantive  doctrine-permit  recovery against
state officers  on pure contract claims against a state (unless the contract were  specifi-
cally to  make an officer a guarantor or otherwise  co-liable  on the state's contracts),
given what I understand  is an accepted  rule that a disclosed agent is not ordinarily
liable for performing the principal's contract.  See RESTATEMENT  (SECOND)  OF AGENCY
§§ 320,  328  (1957).
114  See Vfizquez,  supra  note 7, at 888-93.  For my further discussion of the "princi-
ple" of immunity, see  infra Part III.
115  See Vdzquez,  supra note 7, at 902.
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ties as well from a "supremacy" strand perspective, on the theory that
official  immunities  are  designed  to  achieve  optimal  deterrence  of
legal violations.
Vdzquez's  positive  argument in favor of retaining  officer immu-
nity as constitutionally compelled appears  to rest on the following as-
sumptions-first,  that  those  immunities  are  calibrated  to  achieve
appropriate  constitutional goals  (deterrence  of federal law violations
and noninterference  with enforcement  of valid  state laws),  and sec-
ond, that there would be no change in the appropriate  calibrations if
the liability were  shifted to the government.  As to the  first assump-
tion-that the Court determines  (or seeks to determine)  what immu-
nities are required so  as to optimize deterrence  of wrongful  conduct
while  minimizing  adverse  effects  on  the  proper  execution  of the
laws-Professor V5.zquez acknowledges  that the current shape of offi-
cial immunity doctrine may provide more protection against individ-
ual liability than is necessary.  But he argues  that the basic remedial
framework is  capable of being adjusted to provide appropriate  levels
of deterrence and appropriate protection of the supremacy of federal
law." 6  Other distinguished federal courts scholars also assume or ar-
gue that the current framework of remedies and immunities is about
right." 7  But the empirical basis to conclude that the system of reme-
dies on  the whole  works appropriately  to deter violations  of federal
law and properly redress  the wrongs  done to those injured by viola-
tions that do occur is thin; defining a baseline of "acceptable" levels of
violation  is controversial;  and at least one recent study suggests that
the current system may both overdeter law enforcement  officials and
undercompensate  those who are wronged."i8  Before officer immuni-
ties are entrenched  and extended to entity liability in a way that cuts
116  See id. at 903;  see alsoJohn C. Jeffries,Jr.,  In  Praise  of the Eleventh Amendment and
Section 1983, 84 VA.  L. REv. 47 (1998).
117  SeeWoolhandler, supra note 8, at 921;  see alsojeffries,  supra  note 116, at 53-54
("[C]onstitutional  tort regime based on fault is wise policy" and "[t]o that extent,...
the law of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983  [is)  fundamentally sound, de-
spite rococo doctrine and occasional nuttiness....  [V]iewing the Eleventh Amend-
ment and Section 1983 as an integrated liability regime...  show[s]  the hidden sense
in current law."); Jeffries,  supra note 5, at 99-100  (asserting that the qualified immu-
nity concept protecting officers from personal liability without fault has the advantage
of allowing the development of new law).
118  See Cornelia  T.L. Pillard,  Taking Fiction Seriously: The Strange Results of Public
Officials' Individual  Liability Under Bivens,  88  GEo. LJ. 65,  78, 96-97 (1999)  (arguing
principally that Bivens suits underdeter and underremediate but noting that "residual
uncertainty" about indemnification and uncertainty about the scope of immunity may
cause  concern  for individual  officers).  One  wonders, for example, whether, if the
remedial system for public officer wrongdoing were well-calibrated, one would see the
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off opportunities for redress, they should be more carefully, and em-
pirically, scrutinized.
Even if one were  to assume that the present system in some way
optimizes  deterrence  and that that is  the  most important  goal  of a
judicial  remedial  system, V5.zquez  may well  be mistaken  in thinking
that, in  a system  of state  liability,  the  same  liability  awards  and the
same immunities would achieve  the same levels of deterrence as in a
system of individual liability.  Whatever the  theoretical inclinations of
a hypothetically rational state officer to either purchase liability insur-
ance or insist on indemnity from the state,119 an organization's capaci-
ties  to plan  for and  minimize  liabilities  are  much greater  than any
individual officer's, and an organization's  abilities to raise revenue are
much greater than any individual officer's.  The rationality of an indi-
vidual is simply not identical to the rationality of an organization; the
information available to an organization and its costs of acquiring and
sharing that information are not identical to the costs for individuals
acting on their own.120  The costs of determining whether officers are
entitled to indemnification  are not trivial, and the uncertainties intro-
duced  by that process  may,  as a realistic  matter, both  overdeter and
underremediate  violations of law.
Although it maybe correct that if one takes the principle of state
sovereign  immunity  as of fundamental  and real importance,  and fo-
cuses only on this, it would be logical  to impose constitutional  limits
on officer liability in order  to avoid pressures for state indemnifica-
tion,  I  am  unpersuaded  that the  immunities  of  executive  officials
should be regarded  as constitutionally compelled  in any of their de-
number of well-publicized episodes of alleged police brutality against minority group
members  in custody that we  have in recent years.
119  See V5.zquez,  supra note 7, at 904.
120  See  PETER  SCHUCK,  SUING  GOVERNMENT:  CITIZEN  REMEDIES  FOR  OFFICIAL
WRONGS  98  (1984)  ("[Mluch wrongdoing  is rooted in organizational conditions  and
can  only be  organizationally deterred.");  see  also id. at 5-12  (describing  conditions
pertaining to law compliance and the need for the government entity to identify, and
communicate,  legal norms, and change practices to minimize violations of law); Melt-
zer,  supra note  12, at 1020-23.  There  is law and  economics  literature  arguing that
under some  conditions regimes  allocating  liability to individual  employees produce
identical results to regimes of entity liability.  See, e.g., Reinier H. Kraakman,  Corporate
Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls,  93 YALE LJ. 857 (1984);  Larry Kramer &
Alan  0.  Sykes,  Municipal Liability Under § 1983: A  Legal and Economic Analysis, 1987
Sup. CT. REV.  249; Christopher D. Stone,  The Place of  Enterprise  Liability in the Control of
Corporate  Conduct, 90 YALE  L.J. 1 (1980).  But these conditions are typically not met in
public employment settings, where, for example, the sued employee's assets are likely
to be small relative  to the injuries complained of (and the assets of the entity).  See,
e.g.,  Kramer  & Sykes,  supra, at 272,  276-87  (exploring  effects  of different regimes
where the individual employee  is judgment proof).
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tail, much less that the Constitution would compel extension of those
immunities to the entities in question.  Older cases,  like Little v. Bar-
reme, 121 recognized no immunity for those who acted without statutory
authority.  It may be that a historically authentic inquiry into the com-
mon law remedial system would distinguish between the nature of im-
munities available for different kinds  of wrongful  acts committed by
executive  officers.  The  Court has  treated  the question of executive
immunities  as  a matter of federal  common law,  changing  the stan-
dards as appeared to the Court empirically necessary to achieve appro-
priate levels of litigation, deterrence, and remediation. 122  While some
of the absolute immunities-for judges and for legislators as to legisla-
tive voting-may be constitutionally  necessary in order for those  of-
ficers to fulfill their constitutional roles, no similar tradition of which I
am aware would have required any particular form of personal immu-
nity for an executive  officer.
But perhaps the most important point, for purposes  of this Arti-
cle, is to challenge the appeal to coherence  as a basis for constitution-
alizing  and  extending  official  immunities.  To  the  extent  that
Professor V5.zquez's argument rests on the goal of seeking coherence
with  the principle of sovereign  immunity, it is my claim  that at this
point one should prefer more opportunities for individual justice over
greater coherence.
2 3
C.  Taking the Court at Its Word
Finally, I want to note  that the Court does not conceptualize  its
decisions in these three cases as propounding a rational remedial re-
gime,  consistent  with  historic  traditions  of relief for  government
wrongdoing and best designed to achieve appropriate  levels of deter-
rence of state conduct that violates federal law.'2 4  It is worth remem-
121  6 U.S.  (2 Cranch)  170  (1804).
122  See,  e.g.,  Harlow v.  Fitzgerald,  457 U.S.  800  (1982).  The Harlow standard  is
applied as well to § 1983 actions against state  or local officials.  See, e.g., Anderson v.
Creighton,  483 U.S.  635  (1987).
123  A further question raised by Professor Vazquez's argument is its effects on offi-
cial immunity for federal officers.  At least since Harlow the Court has applied identi-
cal immunities to federal, state, and local officers.  See supra note 122.  Under current
law, Congress has power to waive the federal government's immunity from suit on any
kind of claim but lacks power to abrogate states' immunity except when acting under
Section  5 of the 14th Amendment or possibly other post-11th  amendments.  Where
Congress cannot abrogate state immunity, it may well have good cause to substantially
narrow  the range of officer immunity for state officers, while  regarding the federal
government's  consent to be sued as obviating the need to do so for federal officers.
124  But see Vizquez, supra note 7, at 877-78  (arguing that the Court views individ-
ual officer liability as a more effective  deterrent than entity liability).  Professor Viz-
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bering that the Court essentially eschewed history (in the sense of the
judicial precedents and common law remedial traditions)  as a help in
understanding  the  scope  of states'  immunity  from  suit  in  federal
courts  when,  in  Pennhurst State Sch.  &  Hosp. v.  Halderman, 125  it an-
nounced that it was not history and remedial traditions, but rather the
supremacy of federal  law, that justified  Ex parte Young actions  for in-
junctive relief under federal law  but not for injunctive  relief under
state law.126  And in  both the  nineteenth  century,  and in  the most
recent cases,  the  Court has not, for the most part, sought to justify
sovereign  immunity by reasoned argument. 127  Rather, it claims  that
"the contours of sovereign immunity are determined by the Founders'
understanding, not by the principles or limitations derived from natu-
ral law" or other sources.128
quez cites FDIC  v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471  (1994),  in support, which in turn explains first,
that the individual officer remedy against federal officers recognized in Bivens (a rem-
edy that parallels the §  1983 remedy against state officers)  was created because sover-
eign  immunity  barred  the  remedy  against  the  entity-and,  by  implication,  not
because  it  was  deemed more  effective.  Later, the  opinion  quotes  from  Carlson v.
Green, 446 U.S. 14  (1980),  in which the Court noted that a Bivens remedy runs against
individual  officers,  and  is  thus  a  more  effective  deterrent  than  the  Federal  Tort
Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 79-601,  60 Stat. 842  (1946)  (codified as amended in scattered
sections  of 28 U.S.C.)  (FTCA)  remedy, which  runs against the  United  States.  This
statement in  Green is ambiguous, suggesting that the greater effectiveness  might have
depended on who the defendant was or on the limitations of the FTCA remedy: FTCA
claims  are hedged  by a number of limitations and procedures  not applicable  to the
Bivens cause of action.  A reading of the entire passage  in Meyer does not support the
view that the Court, in  recognizing suits against officers, was primarily motivated by
the view that such actions were better deterrents  than actions against the government
itself-at the  time  Bivens was  created, suits against the  United  States itself were re-
garded  as barred by the federal government's sovereign  immunity.
125  465 U.S.  89  (1984).
126  See id. at 105-06;  see also  Jackson, supra note 54, at 60-62  (criticizing the Court
for shifting away  from justifications  based on remedial  traditions).
127  See United  States v. Lee,  106 U.S.  196,  206  (1882)  ("[I]t is difficult to  see on
what solid foundation of principle the exemption from liability to suit rests.");  see also
Seminole  Tribe, 517 U.S. at 68-69  (offering historical claims  that sovereign  immunity
existed and was important, but not reasons in principle).  For one possible exception,
see Alden, 119 S.  Ct. at 2264-66, where the Court suggests that sovereign immunity is
consistent with self-governance.  The Court fails, however, to explain why self-govern-
ance  of the  nation, when  Congress acts within  an enumerated power to abrogate  a
state's immunity, see Daniel A. Farber, Pledging  A New Allegiance: An Essay on Sovereignty
and the New Federalism,  75 NOTRE  DAME  L. REv.  1133,  1143 (2000)  (describing Alden as
struggling "in vain  to find some practical function for sovereign immunity"),  would
not support precisely  the contrary result-raising the unanswered question, on what
basis did the Court choose to value state self-governance  over national self-governance
notwithstanding  the Supremacy Clause?
128  Alden, 119  S.  Ct. at 2257.
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If what the  Court was  doing were  simply giving  effect  to tradi-
tional forms  of action  and providing  super-protection  to  the  states
from suits on their own contracts, this field would be far less troubling
than it is.  But the Court has expanded  the scope  of state sovereign
immunity  beyond  that understood  by  the  framing  generation,  re-
jecting John Marshall's party of record rule by which federal jurisdic-
tion over an action to recover money in the hands of Ohio tax officials
was sustained. 129  It has, at the same time, increased the scope of im-
munities that  officers  enjoy when  sued for violations  of federal  law
beyond those contemplated by the older cases.  So the claim that it is
determining the scope  of immunities  based on historic understand-
ings does not ring true.  As to Professor V6zquez's  argument, I agree
that it would be  appropriate for  the Court  to consider  the  balance
between remedial  effectiveness  and interference  with  governance  in
defining the shape of a federal  common law of remedies for govern-
ment wrongdoing,  a background set of rules  against which Congress
would legislate.  But that is not what the Court is  doing here, either.
What the Court apparently sees itself doing is protecting state sover-
eign immunity as a deep constitutional principle-in ways that do not
correspond to traditional distinctions  or to the distinction Woolhan-
dler propounds between new and old property.  In doing so the Court
is  increasing  the zone  of government  non-accountability  to law,  in
ways inconsistent with the Supremacy Clause, with basic rule-of-law no-
tions, and with representative  self-government  at the federal level.
III.  ON COMPROMISE  AND  PRINCIPLE  AS ASSUMPTIONS  IN
CONSTrrUTIONAL  INTERPRETATION
Prominent  in several  of the  contributions  to this  Symposium is
the recognition that the Court is now treating "sovereign immunity" as
a very basic and important constitutional principle.130  Professor Vz-
quez, for example, is quite right to notice that the Court's recent cases
have elevated the principle of sovereign  immunity to a positive value
in ways that differ markedly in tone from decisions earlier in this cen-
tury.13'  It is one thing to say, we have sovereign immunity because we
have always had it (even if there are not terribly good reasons why),
129  See Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22  U.S.  (9 Wheat.)  738  (1824).
130  See Farber, supra note 127 at 1135-37  (noting the majority's  "reverential  lan-
guage  toward  the states");  Meltzer, supra note  12, at 1032-37  & n.110  (noting the
"seemingly relentless expansion of state sovereign immunity"); V5zquez,  supra note 7
at 888-91.
131  See V~zquez,  supra note  7, at 860,  888-90  (discussing the  "increasing promi-
nence" of "state sovereignty" concerns  in, for example,  Coeur d'Alene, Alden, and Col-
lege Savings Bank).  For a similar argument predating this Term's trilogy, see Vicki C.
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and we must to some extent accommodate our doctrine to it. On this
view, the immunity may be treated, as Vzquez suggests, as something
of a formality, barring only limited forms of relief and capable  of be-
ing circumvented  through various  devices of pleading.  While  David
Currie has written that the Constitution was not likely to be amended
simply to change the caption on a complaint,5 2 historical scholarship
has shown that in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries distinc-
tions in the captions of complaints were in some significant ways what
the immunity was about.133
But for this Court, the  Seminole Tribe Court, the idea of sovereign
immunity  has  assumed  mythic  proportions.  Indeed,  it  sometimes
seems to be carrying most of the weight of the Court's commitment to
judicial  enforcement  of federalism  restraints  on  its back.  That the
Court now  treats the idea of sovereign  immunity  (and the Eleventh
Amendment  as  emblemizing  it)  as  deep  and fundamental  constitu-
tional principles seems clear.  Now what are we to make of this?' 34
A.  The Problem: The  "Principle"  of State Sovereign Immunity and the
"Compromise" of the U.S. Senate
Clearly  the Court is  treating the Eleventh Amendment  as stand-
ing  for  an  important  though  unwritten  constitutional  principle,  a
"postulate," of deep significance.  Alden says that while the states'  im-
munity from suit is  "sometimes referred  to  ...  as  'Eleventh  Amend-
ment  immunity,"'  the  "sovereign  immunity  of the  States  neither
derives  from  nor  is  limited  by the  terms  of the  Eleventh  Amend-
ment. '1 3 5  The  Alden Court quotes  Monaco v Mississippi:
Jackson,  Coeur d'Alene, Federal Courts and the Supremacy of  Federal  Law: The Competing
Paradigms  of ChiefJustices  Marshall and Rehnquist, 15  CONST.  COMMENTARY  301  (1998).
132  See Currie,  supra note 106,  at 167.
133  See Osborn, 22 U.S. at 738 (asserting that if the state could have been pleaded as
a party defendant it should have been, but if not, the party of record rule would apply
to permit suit to proceed against the state officers);  see also Woolhandler, supra note
76,  at  130-32,  136-37;  see  also supra text  accompanying  notes  103-07  (discussing
O'Connor).
134  For a  thoughtful  explication  of the  reasons  for the  resurgence  of the  11th
Amendment and state sovereign immunity, see Fletcher, supra  note 19, at 843; for my
own earlier thoughts on this, see Jackson,  supra note 1.  For a perceptive  description
of the new constitutional faith informing these and other decisions, see Farber,  supra
note 127, at 1133.
135  Alden,  119  S.  Ct. at 2246.  If the Amendment  were merely  clarificatory  of a
deep understanding that states were immune from suit by any one, it is odd that it is
not more  clear in  expressing this understanding.  For an alternative  explanation  of
what  the Amendment  was  clarifying  that supports  the  "diversity  repeal" view,  see
Pfander, supra note 53, at 1355-56  (arguing that the Constitution was not intended to
[VOL.  75:3PRINCIPLE  AND  COMPROMISE
Manifestly  we  cannot  rest  with  a  mere  literal  application  of  the
words of §  2 of Article III, or assume that the letter of the Eleventh
Amendment  exhausts  the restrictions  upon  suits against non-con-
senting States.  Behind  the words of the  constitutional  provisions
are postulates which limit and control.'36
Thus, since Hans held  that the principle  of immunity for which the
Amendment stands  bars suits  against a  state in federal  court by the
state's own citizens, the "principle" has been expanded to bar suits in
admiralty, suits by a foreign  state against a  state, suits specifically au-
thorized by Congress under Article  I  powers,  and,  in  Alden, suits  in
state courts without the state's  consent.
Just as  clearly, however,  the  Court  treats  other portions  of the
Constitution-including  provisions  relating  to  federalism-not  as
standing for generalizable,  deep principles but as more constrained,
as principles  of more limited application, or as the product of com-
promise, representing no principled consensus at all but simply a mo-
dus vivendi.  Consider  Reynolds  v.  Sims,'
3 7  where  the  Court  asserted
that "the fundamental  principle of representative  government in  this
country is  one of equal  representation for equal  numbers of people
....  Legislators represent people, not trees or acres."18  While  Reyn-
olds v.  Sims treated  equality of representation  as  a fundamental  and
deep principle, it  treated the Constitution's provisions for the United
States  Senate  quite differently.  Responding  to Alabama's  argument
that the apportionment of two U.S. Senators to each state regardless
of population suggested that a state had legitimate interests in  appor-
tioning its own legislature on a basis other than population, the Court
explained,
We ...  find the federal analogy inapposite and irrelevant...  The
system of representation in the two Houses  [of Congress] is one...
conceived out of compromise  and concession  indispensable  to the
establishment of our federal republic....  [I] t is based on the con-
sideration that in establishing our type of federalism a group of for-
merly  independent  States  bound  themselves  together under  one
national government....  [S]ubdivisions  of States  ...  never were
and never  have been  considered  as  sovereign  entities  .... The
change liability rules for debts incurred by states prior to enactment of the Constitu-
tion and that the 11th Amendment was intended as a narrow correction to  Chisholm,
which had entertained an action to enforce such a debt under a diverse-party head of
jurisdiction).
136  Alden,  119 S.  Ct. at 2254  (quoting Principality of Monaco  v. Mississippi,  292
U.S.  313, 322  (1934)).
137  377 U.S.  533  (1964).
138  Id. at 560-62.
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relationship of the States to the Federal Government  could hardly
be less analogous.
15 9
The federal  analogy is seen  as inapposite,  then, in part because
the composition of the Senate was "conceived out of compromise and
concession."  The compromise provision for equality of state represen-
tation in the Senate is not understood  as a principled model for the
internal  composition  of the states'  legislatures,  but rather  as  some-
thing to be contained,  so as not to obstruct the larger "principle" of
equal representation  of persons described  above. 140
Bruce  Ackerman  has  recently  argued  that another  part  of the
Constitution  represents  at best  a  compromise  (with  evil)  and not a
general principle to be expanded upon.  In  arguing that the Constitu-
tion's  "direct" taxes provision  does not limit Congress from consider-
ing  proposals  for  flat  taxes,  Ackerman  draws  attention  to  early
decisions  narrowly  interpreting  this limitation  on the  federal  taxing
power, on grounds that explicitly note the origin of the phrase in  an
effort  to protect  the  property of slave  owners  from  being  taxed.141
Ackerman approves of those Justices who, seeing the degree to which
139  Id. at 573-75.
140  As is clear from the quotation in text above, the Court provides an additional
reason why the compromise  represented by the Senate should not be extended: that
the subdivisions of the states were never independent sovereigns.  See id. at 575.  Pass-
ing  the point that  it is not at all clear that  the states  were  ever fully independent
sovereigns,  seeJack Rakove,  Making a Hash of Sovereignty, Part I,  2  GREEN  BAG  2d. 35,
39-43 (1998), functional  differences between  local governments and the states under
the  Constitution  might support  the  Court's  refusal  to  extend  the  principle  of the
Senate:  while  Congress  is prohibited  from manipulating  state  boundaries,  no such
federal constitutional limit applies to the states' powers to manipulate the boundaries
of its internal divisions,  seeBriffault, supra  note 111, at 1335-36.  This power to manip-
ulate coupled with a power to establish non-population based units of representation
might have been seen as opening the door to too much in the way of anti-democratic
possibilities.  The  Reynolds Court could be taken to say that the "principle" for which
the Senate stands is  that the states had some form of sovereignty but not necessarily
the power to decide on a principle of internal representation  that deviates from one-
person  one-vote.  By a  similar argument,  the  11th Amendment  might be  taken to
stand, not for the principle  of state  sovereign  immunity, but for the principle  that
states were sovereign to some extent-that is, at a level of generality about the princi-
ple at hand that would not resolve (at least not in the Court's direction) the question
of state immunity on federal-question claims by a state's own citizens.  For one discus-
sion of the problem of levels of generality, see  Laurence  H. Tribe & Michael  Doff,
Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U.  CHI.  L. REv. 1057  (1990).
141  See generally Bruce Ackerman,  Taxation and the Constitution,  99 COLUM L. REv. 1
(1999).  Ackerman describes how one leading "states-rights" member of the Conven-
tion responded  as a Supreme  Court Justice  to the first challenge  to a federal tax  as
violating the rule on direct taxes:
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a provision  like that limiting the tax power was born of compromise,
sought to restrain its interpretation. 142
Intelligent  and  reasonably  principled  constitutional  interpreta-
tion would seem to require that we be able to distinguish  among dif-
ferent  kinds  of constitutional  provisions:  to  identify  those  that are
fundamental,  and must be given effect beyond their literal  terms on
the basis of what those terms signify more generally, and those that
are  limited  to  their  literal  and  obvious  application.  Some  scholars
have  suggested a distinction  between what they describe  as constitu-
tions of "principle" and constitutions  of "compromise,"' 4 3  though in
some senses, every constitution is a constitution both of principle and
While  Paterson  ultimately  endorsed  the  Constitution,  he  should  be
viewed  as the leading Founder committed to  states'  rights, and so his view
should be considered with special care:
On the part of the plaintiff in error, it has been contended, that the
rule of apportionment is to be favored, rather than the rule of uniform-
ity; and, of course, that the instrmnent is to receive such a construction,
as will extend the former, and restrict the latter.  I am not of that opin-
ion. The constitution  has been  considered  as  an accommodating  sys-
tem; it was  the  effect of mutual sacrifices  and concessions;  it was  the
work of compromise.  The rule of apportionment is of this nature; it is
radically  wrong;  it cannot be  supported  by any solid  reasoning.  Why
should slaves, who are a species of property, be represented more than
any other property? The rule, therefore, ought not to  be extended by
construction.
Again, numbers do not afford ajust estimate or rule of wealth. It is,
indeed, a very uncertain and incompetent sign of opulence. This is an-
other reason  against  the  extension  of the principle  laid  down  in the
Constitution.
Id. at 22-23 (quoting Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S.  (3 Dail.)  171,  177  (1796)).  This
is a candid argument that the rule of apportionment was a "work of compromise" and
.ought not to be extended by construction."  Id.
142  See Ackerman,  supra note 141, at 22  (approving of the Court's unanimous re-
jection  of an  early "effort  to transform  a narrow  bargain with  slavery  into a grand
principle of federalism that would cripple  [federal]  taxing powers");  id. at 51  (argu-
ing that, other  than to  strike  down  a classic  "capitation tax,"  the Court should not
"expand the direct tax provisions beyond  this textually enshrined example  in obedi-
ence  to a deal with slavery that America has otherwise  abrogated").  On my view the
11th Amendment should not be "expanded" beyond its text, which should be read as
barring  federal  courts  from  exercising  "diversity"  based jurisdiction  over  claims
against states  (with possible implications  as well for supplemental jurisdiction).  See
Jackson, supra note 54, at 55-59; see also id. at 72-104 (arguing that sovereign immu-
nity can  help shape  federal  common  law of remedies  without precluding  congres-
sional abrogation).
143  See, e.g., Wiktor Osiatynski,  The Constitution-Making  Process in Poland,  13 LAw &
POLICY 125 (1991),  reprinted  in Vicki C.JACKSON & MARK TusHNET, CoMPARATIVE  CON-
STrrUTIONAL LAW  288-93  (1999).
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of compromise.  Whenjudges are called on to determine the meaning
of some  aspect of the Constitution  (whether text or a claimed extra-
textual rule), should it matter whether that aspect is seen as a compro-
mise or as a principle?  Since the Court evidently does distinguish be-
tween  those  provisions  that  are  to  be  cabined  to  their  terms,  or
construed  narrowly,  and those that are  understood  merely as repre-
sentatives of a basic principle to be given broader expression through
interpretation, how does-how should-it decide?
B.  On the Impossibility (and Inevitability) of Distinguishing
Constitutional  Compromise  from Constitutional  Principle
The  possibility  of  distinguishing  between  "compromise"  and
"principle" may be chimerical and involves many of the contingencies
and indeterminacies  that trouble  constitutional  interpretation  more
generally.  Assuming  one  could agree  on what  constitutes  a "princi-
ple"  as  opposed  to  a "compromise,"  language  agreed  on by  groups
almost always involves some degree of compromise,  over nuance if not
over larger  questions.  Moreover, "principled" portions of a constitu-
tion may have  been "bargained for" in compromises  over other por-
tions, entailing risks that divergent interpretive  approaches  based on
the asserted difference between compromise and principle would fail
to meet the expectations of the drafters (if their expectations  are rele-
vant, which might be a different matter for multi-generational  consti-
tutions than for ordinary  statutes).144  While  some provisions  of the
Constitution  are  commonly  described  as  compromises  (e.g.,  those
dealing  with slavery  and  the  three-fifths  rule),  even  the  most basic
structural decisions of the 1787 Convention were also compromises-
144  For an excellent discussion of the difficulties entailed in efforts to determine
the  intent of a legal  text that is produced  by a multi-member body, see WI.LMf  N.
ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL.,  LEGIsLArION AND  STATUTORY  INTERPRETATION  214-22  (2000).  For
an effort to ground a theory of statutory interpretation in the desire  to constrain the
effect  of narrow  interest group bargains  towards  more public-regarding  results,  see
Jonathan  R. Macey,  Promoting  Public-Regarding  Legislation Through Statutoy Interpreta-
tion: An Interest Group Mode  86  COLUM.  L. REV.  223  (1986)  (arguing that the Court
should not seek  to discern  and  give effect to a "deal" behind  legislation  but rather
should be limited by the enacted text in  order to raise the costs and constrain  non-
public-regarding  of legislative deal-making).  Although the difficulties of distinguish-
ing "private  deals" from "public regarding" statutes are legion, many students of the
legislative  process still  behave  as though  these  differences  are discernible.  See,  e.g.,
ESKRIDGE ET AL.,  supra, at 355-56 (discussing the Court's narrow construction of some
public grants as reflecting a suspicion of the legislative  allocation of "public benefits
to narrow interests" and its willingness to construe public grants more liberally when
the grant "clearly promotes a public value" or "the costs and benefits of the grant are
spread widely across  the public").
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as in  the "Great  Compromise"  establishing  the  "principle" that the
national legislature  is bicameral  and that only one  house of the na-
tional legislature  is apportioned by population while the other is ap-
portioned by state.
What about the "rights" provisions-do these reflect compromise
or principle in the constitutional process?  One might be tempted at
first to say that the individual  rights protecting provisions  are more
"principled" or more representative of deep principles than the provi-
sions  concerning  government  structure.  But  if  the  Fourteenth
Amendment  is  to  serve  as  an  example,  the  answer  to  my question
might be both.  The Amendment was plainly intended at some level to
guarantee  rights  of national  citizenship  and  advance  constitutional
principles  of equality before the law.  But according to the Court, the
Amendment also reflected  a compromise  between  those who  would
empower Congress entirely to define the rights of citizens and those
who sought to constrain  Congress's powers  to those of enforcement
rather than definition  of rights.145
Since the entire Constitution of 1787 was in a sense founded on
compromises, the effort to distinguish among its provisions and associ-
ated amendments on such a basis may be one doomed to failure.  De-
spite  the  conceptual  difficulty-and  perhaps  the  impossibility-of
drawing  a principled  line between  principle  and  compromise,  it is
hard to resist the temptation to attempt such an effort. As a sociolegal
matter, as  a constitution  exists over time, understandings  of its basic
"principles" also  evolve,  with some  aspects  tending to assume  larger
proportions than others based in part on ascription as large principles
(rather  than  as  compromises).146  One  could  resort  to  familiar
(though contestable)  techniques to determine whether particular pro-
145  See City of Boerne  v. Flores,  521  U.S. 507, 520-24  (1997).  In evaluating the
accuracy  of the Court's  history of the  14th Amendment  as a compromise  between
these  purposes, see the work  of historian EIc FoNER,  RECONSTRUGrION:  AMErRcA's
UNIaSHED  REvOLUTON,  1863-1877, at 251-61  (1988)  (suggesting that the revision
of Bingham's initial proposal reflected a desire to strengthen the Constitution's pro-
tections  of rights by securing them against  congressional weakening  should Demo-
crats take over Congress after the Amendment was ratified by assuring that the courts
could  directly enforce the guarantees of Section  1 without Congress).
146  Recognizing  the  evolution  of constitutional  understandings  marks  me  as
neither a "pure  originalist" nor as  someone  who believes  that history  and original
understandings have only indeterminacy  to offer.  On constitutional interpretation,  I
find much to  admire in  the complexity and nuance of such works  as Fallon,  supra
note 75, at 1194-1209, Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith,  The Sedimentary Constitution,
147 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1998), and David A. Strauss,  Common Law ConstitutionalInterpreta-
tion, 63 U. CHI.  L. REV.  877  (1996)  as well as in Professor Dworkin's work, infra note
147.
200o]NOTRE  DAME  LAW  REVIEW
visions are reflective of larger principles or more narrow principles or
compromises,  techniques  discussed  both  by  constitutional  theorists
and statutory interpreters.1 47  But it is almost impossible to escape the
enterprise  of categorizing  aspects  of the Constitution as more or less
central, more or less basic, and more or less subject to judicial elabora-
tion as  constraints.' 48
But what, if any, significance  do these possible  differences  have
for the task of interpretation over time?  I do not mean to suggest that
seeing something as  a "compromise" means that subsequent  genera-
tions can ignore its provisions or need only give it the most ritualistic
protection.  Compromise is important;  compromise between compet-
ing principles  is  often  essential  to  constitution  making  and mainte-
nance; security in enforcement of compromises may be important for
future bargaining;  and compromises may have become embedded  in
a legal landscape and require continued enforcement in order to pro-
mote stability and coherence.  My claim is that whether a proposition
is seen as a matter of principle, or as a more narrow compromise, may
influence  the  degree  to which  the proposition  is  extended  to  new
situations.' 49
147  Provisions reflecting more specific and narrow language  may, for example, re-
flect more specific and narrow purpose  than others.  General language  may be sug-
gestive  of agreement on a general  principle;  more detailed,  specific  language  may
reflect either a narrower principle or a carefully  crafted compromise by the drafters.
Compare,  e.g., U.S.  CONsT. amend. XII (establishing voting rules for presidential selec-
tion in  the House of Representatives),  with U.S.  CONST.  amend. XIV  (guaranteeing
"equal protection").  Cf RONALD  DwoRINm,  TAKrNG  RIGHTS  SERIOUSLY  131-49 (1977);
Ronald Dworkin,  The Forum ofPrinciple,  56 N.Y.U. L. REV.  469,477-78, 488-97  (1981)
(distinguishing  general  proposition  or concepts  from  more  specific  "conceptions"
and discussing the differences  between  "abstract and concrete" intentions).
148  This process of categorization  may take place with respect to particular provi-
sions or with respect to claims of extratextual understandings  (such as that equality of
treatment is a bedrock requirement for both state and federal governments,  see, e.g.,
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954),  notwithstanding the existence of slavery at the
time the Fifth Amendment's  Due Process Clause was adopted).  Identifying what the
principles are and, in the event of a conflict between different versions of a principle,
which  version is "right" or "fits best" is a major task of constitutional interpretation.
For a brief discussion of how to characterize  the "principle" of the Eleventh Amend-
ment  (if it were viewed  as a principle and not a compromise),  see  infra note 150.
149  One possibility  is that this difference should have no effect-that once a Con-
stitution  is ratified, its parts should all be treated as "law" by the courts and no part
should be favored; the task of rendering judgment requires  the Court to take a neu-
tral stance  with respect to whether particular provisions  were included as a result of
agreements  in principle, unresolved  compromises, or adventitious  events-all of the
Constitution is equally  "law."  Frank Michelman writes, for example,  that while  com-
promise in writing or amending a constitution  is inevitable and is accepted as legiti-
mate,  once a  text is  ratified  the  "conventional  wisdom"  is that  the Supreme  Court
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C.  Intepretive Implications of Understanding  the Eleventh Amendment as
a Compromise Rather Than as a Principle
Notwithstanding the conceptual  and interpretive difficulties, the
Court itself has,  on occasion,  treated  the  Constitution  as if it could
distinguish those parts reflecting compromise and entitled to no fur-
ther application beyond their immediate reach, from those aspects of
Justices are to be "faithful servants" of that constitutional law.  See Frank Michelman,
Saving Old Glory: On Constitutional  Iconography, 42 STAN. L. REv. 1337, 1340-44 (1990).
But while in form it might seem possible to say, treat the entire Constitution in all its
provisions as equally "law" and interpret each according to the same methodology, in
practice it is not. The human search for meaning and the inevitable carrying-on  (and
transmutation of) understandings of the breadth  of the principle for which a provi-
sion  (or a Constitution) stands will necessarily be subject to dispute, contention, and
resort to claims of both original understandings and overall structure.
Michael  Doff has  suggested  a different problem in  comments on this  idea: he
argues that history suggests that to the extent the Court sees a portion of the Constitu-
tion as involving a compromise, it will be inclined vigorously to enforce its terms de-
spite the evil or lack ofjustice  in so doing.  See Michael  Doff, No Federalists  Here: Anti-
Federalism  and Nationalism  on the Rehnquist Court,  31  RUTGERS  L.J. (forthcoming 2000).
His example  is Dred Scott, 60 U.S.  (19  How.)  393  (1856).  But in Dred Scott,  the Court
was  enforcing what it saw as  a constitutional  principle  that slaves were property,  a
principle barring Congress from interfering with the growth of slavery as an institu-
tion.  Ignoring the compromise reflected in the Constitution's text (i.e., the absence
of the word "slave," the fact that slaves counted as three-fifths of persons for represen-
tation and taxing purposes, that Congress was prohibited to regulate  the slave trade
but only for 20 years, etc.),  the Court adopted a controversial  interpretation that one
could say either was based on a principle nowhere spelled out in the Constitution, or
alternatively, an interpretation designed  (to borrow from the field of statutory inter-
pretation) to give slaveholders the full benefit of a quite different bargain, a predicate
of which was that there would be no federal interference with slavery's growth, a "bar-
gain" or "principle" not reflected in constitutional  text.  See DON  E. FEHRENRACBER,
THm  DRED  Scorr CAsE  21-27  (1978);  cf. Macey,  supra note  144,  at 226-27,  261-66
(suggesting that courts should  not, in statutory  context, attempt to  give benefit of
bargain beyond terms set forth in authoritative legal document in order to promote
public-regarding process).  Commentary on Dred Scott disagrees on whether the deci-
sion should be regarded as mistaken because it was immoral, or because it relied too
much on "intentionalist" or originalist reasoning, or because it did a poorjob of iden-
tifying those intentions, or even whether it was a correct reading of the Constitution
as it then stood.  (I believe it was not.)  See generally Mark Graber, Desperately Ducking
Slavery: Dred Scott and Contemporary Constitutional  Theory, 14 CONsr.  COMMETrrARY  271,
273 (1997)  (describing as "fruitless" different contemporary efforts to describe, within
particular theories, what was wrong with Dred Scott).  I believe that it was the elevation
of a compromise into a single-minded principle, and/or the misidentification of prin-
ciple, that was at least part of the problem in Dred Scott.  On this reading, Dred Scott's
well-deserved  infamy is not inconsistent with my argument that the  Court's jurispru-
dence would be helpfully mitigated by its viewing the 11th Amendment as the prod-
uct of a narrow compromise  rather than a great principle.
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the Constitution that constitute deep,  consensual principles. 150  Why,
then, does  it  not see the Eleventh Amendment today, like the Senate
or like the  "direct taxes" provision,  as  a  "compromise or concession"
rather than as  a "principle"?  It  is more than a bit mysterious that it  is
not  so  viewed.  The  precision  and  specificity  of  its  language  lend
themselves to  (though they do not compel)  a narrow reading.15 1  The
text is clearly limited to the federal judicial power, and a specific list of
parties  prohibited to sue states  in  federal  courts is  provided.  I  have
elsewhere  argued that the limited language and the circumstances  of
its drafting support an interpretation  of this Amendment  as not con-
straining  the federal  question jurisdiction  of federal  courts.  A  com-
peting  tradition,  embodied  in  Hans v.  Louisiana, exists  and  was
embraced by the Court in  Seminole Tribe. What I ask here is why, given
the reasonable  arguments in  support of a much narrower understand-
ing of the Amendment's scope  in  federal courts, and given the clear
evolution  over  time  of constitutional  principles  of  government  ac-
countability under law administered  by courts, would those who  sup-
port the "Hans" view of the Amendment feel impelled  to treat  it  as
exemplifying a  principle so much broader in  scope than any arguable
reading of its literal terms would support?152
150  See  supra text  accompanying  notes  137-40  (discussing  Reynolds  v.  Sims).  As
noted  earlier, the formulation  of "compromise" and "principle" may be misleading:
one  might  alternatively  consider  the  "level  of generality"  at which  to  identify  the
'principle"  or principles  embodied  in particular provisions.  The  "principle" of the
Senate  may be best understood  by seeing the  Congress as a whole  as mediating be-
tween principles of equality of persons in representation  and the sovereign  status of
the states.  The 11th Amendment could be seen as mediating between principles that
the judicial power should be as broad  as  the legislative under the federal  question
jurisdiction but that states as sovereign should not be subject to suit, without consent,
on obligations incurred under their own laws or (phrased differently) as standing for
the principle that states are  quasi-sovereign permanent polities in the federal Union
(and as such, have to be able not only to make but to control the enforcement of their
own state laws against themselves, free from the jurisdiction  of the federal courts).
151  See  Lawrence  C.  Marshall,  Fighting the  Words of the Eleventh Amendment,  102
HARv  L.  REV.  1342,  1349-71  (1989)  (arguing  that  "literal" meaning  of  the  lth
Amendment's  words  should be applied to  bar all  suits against states  by out of state
citizens  but not suits  by  in-staters,  nor by foreign governments,  and developing  at
length  an  argument  that  11th  Amendment  language  reflected  a  compromise
designed to address narrow situations).  Although diversity theorists differ from Mar-
shall  on whether the Amendment bars  out-of-state citizens from suing a state in fed-
eral  court  under  the  "federal  question"  jurisdiction,  both  theories  read  the
Amendment  (far more narrowly than does the Court) not to bar suits by in-staters or
by foreign  states.
152  As  my  colleague  Carlos  VSzquez  has  recently  reminded  us,  at  least  some
number of the justices in the five-justice majority in Seminole Tribe and this year's tril-
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If the  Eleventh Amendment were viewed  as more  of a compro-
mise-a compromise between Federalists eager to retain the national
government's  power to enforce  federal laws and treaties, on the one
hand, and state  leaders  eager  to protect  states from  injurious judg-
ments on their revolutionary war debt,153  on the other-how would
that affect analysis of the question whether state courts had to enter-
tain federal  causes of action against states?154  One cannot be  confi-
dent that it would have had a dispositive effect.  Under Testa v. Katt155
there was  an arguably open question whether a state court in a state
that retained the doctrine of state sovereign immunity would nonethe-
less be considered to have jurisdiction otherwise adequate and appro-
priate  to  entertain  (and  thus  be  obligated  to  entertain)  a
nonconsented-to  suit  against  a  state.156  While  Howlett  v.  Rose157
strongly suggests that state sovereign immunity rules will not be suffi-
to adhere to Hans for reasons of stare decisis; under these circumstances,  he argues,
"a doctrine  whose  reason for being is  merely  that the matter  has  already been  so
decided is clearly not a doctrine  that warrants expansion."  Carlos Manuel V~zquez,
Night and Day: Coeur d'Alene, Breard,  and the Unraveling  of the Prospective-Retrospective
Distinction in Eleventh Amendment Doctrine, 87 GEo.  L.J.  1, 86-88  (1998)  (noting that
"Justice Scalia did not defend the correctness of Hans  so much as conclude that over-
ruling precedent  was not justified," that few commentators  affirmatively  defend  the
Hans  holding, and that "it is difficult to defend a regime  in which federal law validly
imposes obligations on the states but federal courts lack the power to entertain suits
against the states to enforce  those obligations").
153  In  addition  to  the works in  the  1980s by Judge  Gibbons and then-Professor
William Fletcher, see Pfander,  supra note 53.
154  One possibility  is  that my effort  here wrongly assumes the independence  of
one's view of the Amendment as a compromise  (or as a relatively  narrow principle)
and one's view that the Amendment affects "federal question"jurisdiction at all.  That
is,  one  might  think that the  only  way  reasonable  minds could  conclude  that the
Amendment stands for no federal question jurisdiction in suits by private persons or
entities against states in federal courts  (as Seminole Tribe holds) is to view its enactment
as  emblematic of a deep constitutional  principle, in which case,  one  would not be
prepared to see this as a compromise.  However, at least one member of the current
majority at one time found the question of determining what the Eleventh Amend-
ment meant, and whether Hans  was correctly decided, to be quite difficult,  see Welch
v. Texas Dep't of Highways  & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 496 (1987)  (Scalia, J., con-
curring),  and another wrote for the Court in  Hilton v. South  Carolina  Railways, 502
U.S.  197 (1991)  (KennedyJ.,),  on the apparent assumption that the State's constitu-
tional immunity from suit in federal court did not apply in the state courts  (although
the issue was whether the statute created a cause of action against the State, the State
not having asserted  sovereign immunity as such).  See id. at 201-07.
155  330 U.S.  386  (1947).
156  The question I am addressing here is whether the Supremacy  Clause simplic-
iter requires a state court to hear a federal claim against the state, and  not whether, if
the state  court hears  some arguably analogous claims against the state, the anti-dis-
crimination principle of the Supremacy  Clause requires that the state court hear the
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cient to prevent that conclusion,  there might be a difference  under
Testa between  a sovereign  state's  effort to  protect subordinate parts
and a sovereign state's effort to protect its own treasury directly.  And
while  General Oil Co. v. Crain 158 insisted on a state court's entertaining
a suit that the state court regarded as barred by state sovereign immu-
nity, the  relief sought there was an injunction  against a state  officer
and thus not at the core of what the Court has come to regard as the
area  protected  by  state  sovereign  immunity.159  Reasonable  minds
might think that states'  power to  constitute their  own organs  of gov-
ernment includes a power to decide to protect states from suit in their
own courts  (even if they were suable  in federal courts).
But even if one were  so inclined, a less mythologized view of the
significance  of state immunity from private suits in the constitutional
scheme might well have made a difference in the Alden case itself. A
person  viewing  the  Eleventh  Amendment  as  a limited  compromise,
establishing a proposition in serious tension with deeper principles of
government  accountability under law, might have been more willing
to recognize what strikes me as a patent discrimination against federal
law by the State of Maine in its waiver  of immunity.16 0
federal  claim.  See Brief for the United States, Alden (No. 98-436)  (identifying "Ques-
tions Presented");  see also infra notes  160-62.
157  496 U.S.  356  (1990).
158  209 U.S.  211  (1908).
159  Professor Woolhandler dismisses  General Oil Co. v. Crain  far too easily on these
grounds, however,  see Woolhandler, supra note 76, at 150-51,  since the Court's opin-
ion-befuddled  as it is in light of Ex parte Young-proceeded  on the assumption that
the suit against the state officer would have been barred in federal court and, on this
assumption, held that the Constitution required the state court to hear the claim.  See
General Oi4 209 U.S.  at 226.
160  See Reply Brief for the United States  at 4-5,  Alden  (No.  98-436)  (explaining
that the state courts entertain actions  against private employers under the FLSA and
"entertain[] suits against the State for monetary relief, including suits seeking wages
that have been withheld  in violation  of state law").  As the United State's Reply Brief
went on to argue,
Because those claims unquestionably are of the same general type as the
claim asserted  by petitioners  in this case under any plausible view of such a
test,  the  State's  refusal  to  entertain  petitioners'  claim  "flatly  violates  the
Supremacy Clause."
Indeed, this case illustrates the extent to which, under the State's analy-
sis,  a  State's  assertion of sovereign  immunity can  be  used to  discriminate
against federal law.  Maine law permits state employees  to bring an action in
Superior Court to recover unpaid wages.  Thus, an hourly worker who works
more than 40 hours in a week, but is not paid  by the State for those  addi-
tional  hours  of work,  may  bring suit to  recover  unpaid wages.  The only
issue, then, is what substantive law should control the amount of recovery-
i.e.,  the specific  hourly wage to which employees are entitled.  Are  employ-
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The parties appear to be in agreement that the Maine state mini-
mum wage  (which was the same as the federal) applied to public em-
ployees  and  that  public  employees  could  sue  the  State  to  recover
nonpayment of the minimum wage.  Maine law, however, unlike fed-
eral  law, did  not extend the time-and-a-half provisions  of their mini-
mum wage law to public employees.  Hence, public employees  could
not, under state law, sue the State for overtime  claims, such as  those
asserted  by Alden under the federal minimum wage law.  The  State
argued therefore that, under  Testa v. Katt,  the state court lacked juris-
diction over the "analogous" state claim and thus had no obligation to
entertain jurisdiction  over the federal claim. But the petitioners in Al-
den dearly had  the better of this  argument  that, having opened  its
state courts  to suits by state employees  against the State for back pay
under state  law, 161 the state  courts  could  not discriminate  against a
claim brought under federal law.  Had  the Court so ruled,  it could
have  preserved  something of the principle  of state sovereign  immu-
nity while permitting the enforcement of valid federal law.  In the face
of the underlying policy disagreement with federal law about overtime
pay  for  public  employees,  a  court  that  focused  on  the  Eleventh
Amendment as a compromise  provision,  I suggest, would have been
less likely to have so aggressively extended the "principle" of state sov-
ereign  immunity.
Instead, the Alden Court countenanced-with  barely the back of
its hand in consideration-a severe departure  from the anti-discrimi-
nation  rule  of  Testa.162  Alden,  together  with  F/oida Prepaid, thus
ees entitled to recover time and a half, in accordance with federal law, or are
they limited to straight time, as provided under state law?
Id. (citations omitted) (citing Howlett, 496 U.S. at 381, and ME. REv. STAT. ANN.  tit. 26,
§§ 621(2),  626-A,  663(10),  670  (West 1988 & Supp.  1998).
161  See Testa,  330  U.S.  at 386  (holding  that since  state  courts  had entertained
double damage claims under similar statutes, they had adequate jurisdiction to enter-
tain  an  "analogous" federal  claim under a different  statute providing for award  of
treble damages).
162  The Alden Court gave  the  discrimination  claim  extremely short shrift.  In a
section addressed to "[the sole remaining question  ....  whether Maine waived its
immunity,"  Alden,  119 S.  Ct. at  2268,  the Court apparently  limits the  Testa v. Katt
principle of nondiscrimination  to contexts in which the state is not the party defend-
ant (or in which there is no question of state immunity).
Although petitioners  contend  the  State  has  discriminated  against  federal
rights by claiming sovereign immunity from this FLSA suit, there is  no evi-
dence that the State has manipulated its immunity in a systematic fashion to
discriminate  against federal causes of action.  To the extent Maine  has cho-
sen  to  consent  to  certain  classes  of suits,  while  maintaining  its  immunity
from others,  it has done  no more  than  exercise a privilege  of sovereignty
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seems  to hold that the  assertion  of state sovereign  immunity  to bar
adjudication  of a federal claim against a state can constitute  neither
discrimination  against federal  law under  Testa nor a violation  of the
Due Process  Clause.  In short, sovereign immunity to private damage
actions  against a state  is  a super-strong  constitutional  principle,  not
easily subject to being overcome  or qualified by other important con-
stitutional  principles.
Mark  Tushnet argues  that comparative  constitutional  study sug-
gests that the principle  of "bricolage" explains  the building of consti-
tutions, with  borrowings  and  adaptations  of ideas  drawn  from  "an
intellectual and political world that provides  [constitution makers and
interpreters]  with  a bag of concepts  'at hand,'  not all of which are
linked to each other in  some coherent way ....  As bricoleurs, . . . they
reach  into the bag and use the first thing that happens  to fit the im-
mediate problem they are facing. '163  He argues  that "bricolage cau-
tions  against  adopting  interpretive  strategies  that  impute  a  high
degree of constructive rationality to a constitution's drafters... [and]
brings the historical  contingency of all human action  to the fore,"164
which  in  turn  suggests  that  efforts  to  construe  a  constitution  as  a
whole cannot be defended  as an inquiry into actual intention.  Begin-
ning with what he describes as a modest premise that "some constitu-
tional  provisions  should be  understood  to result from  compromises
concomitant  to its  constitutional  immunity  from suit.  The  State,  we  con-
clude, has not consented to suit.
Id.  It is,  I suppose,  possible  to read  this  passage  to  mean  that even  in  state  court
actions against private persons, state  courts  are  free to  discriminate  against federal
claims as long as they do not do so systematically.  A far more plausible reading, how-
ever, is that the requirement of "systematic discrimination"  applies (if it applies at all)
only to claims  against the state itself.  As so understood, however,  it is bad  enough,
apparently countenancing some relatively clear discrimination  against federal claims
as long as it is  not too widespread.
163  Mark Tushnet,  The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional  Law, 108  YALE LJ.
1225,  1286  (1999).
164  Id- at 1229.  Tushnet points to the "bricolage" found in several periods of con-
stitution  drafting, including our own, to  challenge the links  often assumed between
what he calls "rationalized  textualism" and "originalism":
Thinking  about  constitution-making  as  a  process  of "bricolage"  casts
doubt on  a form of textualism  that attributes to the constitution's writers  a
purpose  of creating  a tightly  integrated document  governed  by a form  of
conceptual determinism.  The compromises and sheer randomness found in
the constitution-making  process suggest that it would be wrong to think of
the writers as having so highly rationalized an understanding of their work as
this form of textualism  attributes to  them.
Id. at 1300.
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that rest on no single coherent principle,"1 65 his approach might sug-
gest  the need for skepticism about  claims  that a single amendment
emblematized a deep and pervasive constitutional principle; for it is as
likely that what went into the  drafting and  amendment  process  in-
volved hasty efforts  to respond to an immediate  political problem.166
I suggest that any constitution will be an admixture  of elements:
elements  that constitute  important principles  on which the polity is
built; elements that constitute compromises over central questions on
which  consensus  cannot be reached;  and elements  of what Tushnet
calls "bricolage" borrowed from other settings and contexts that exist
somewhere between fundamental and consensual principles  and fun-
damental  and  unresolved  conflicts.  Although  the  Constitution  of
1787 is built on compromise over the nature of the federal system, it is
appropriate  to note the words "Great Compromise" used to describe
the foundational piece of that process.  The federal structure has sur-
vived  in part because  of the clarity  and consistency  with which  the
fundamentals  of structure  were  described  and have  been  adhered
to-a House made up of representatives  elected  every  two years and
apportioned by population,  a  Senate whose  members  serve  six-year
terms, two from each state, a President separately selected through a
national polling process, and a bar to carving up state territories with-
out their consent.  State  sovereign  immunity  is  at the periphery  of
those constitutional features that most importantly constitute the fed-
eral  union.  Many  of those features  were  also  born  of hard fought
compromise-but compromise that was indeed central to the union.
The Eleventh Amendment, by contrast, should be seen as a com-
promise on a relatively peripheral issue.  A fair reader of history must
conclude that the framing minds held different views on the amena-
bility of states to suit 167 and must also agree that the language  of the
Eleventh  Amendment is limited and specific.  The principle  of state
165  Id. at 1286.
166  The idea of "bricolage" may be more radically indeterminate  in its capacity to
challenge interpretive strategies built on any form of intentionalism; while one might
say that the Amendment represented  no more than a hasty political compromise  re-
sponding  to  an immediate  problem,  one might alternatively  say  that the language,
while narrow, was the best that could be done at the time to express a deeper princi-
ple.  Other constitutional  structures  and principles  can  assist  in reaching  the best
reading.  SeeJackson,  supra note 54, at 44-51.
167  Since Justice  Scalia in  1987 found the question whether to overrule  Hans  un-
characteristically difficult,  see Welch  v. Texas Dep't of Highway  & Pub. Transp.,  483
U.S.  468  (1987),  and ultimately voted to adhere to Hans  in large part for reasons of
stare decisis,  see Pennsylvania v. Union Gas  Co., 491 U.S.  1, 30-36  (1989)  (Scalia, J.,
dissenting),  one might have thought the current majority would have been reluctant
to "extend the precedent"  in the way it has.  See Carlos Manuel V'zquez, Breard, and
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sovereign  immunity,  in  its  current  iteration,  is  in  conflict  with  two
foundational  constitutional  principles:  the  supremacy  of federal  law
and the  rule  of law under which governments  as  well as  people are
bound to  the law and to ordinary legal  remedies for the violation  of
law.  In this light, the reasonable  reader of history should be at least
open  to  reading  the  resulting  constitutional  text  as  a  limited
compromise.
168
D.  Alternatives to Protect the States: Making the "Real"  Procedural
Safeguards of Federalism Work?
A  more  nuanced  and  limited  understanding  of  the  Eleventh
Amendment  (and of the  principle  of sovereign  immunity for which
this  Court believes  it stands)  would  be beneficial  for  other reasons.
Not only is the Court's current expansive understanding of state sover-
eign immunity  lacking textual support in the Constitution and in its
applications and inconsistent with other constitutional principles and
with  older  remedial  traditions,  but history  shows  that the Court  is,
over the long-run, relatively unsuccessful in opposing its view to Con-
gress  on issues of federalism.1 69
Let me be clear, though, that I do not suggest that the structure
of federalism  should never be protected by  the Court.  As I have  ar-
gued elsewhere,  the Constitution  does quite  clearly contemplate  the
continued existence of the states as constitutionally sovereign govern-
ments, elected and chosen by the people of each state, and accounta-
ble to perform  executive,  legislative,  and judicial functions.  Federal
laws  inconsistent with  those  constitutional  responsibilities  (as  "com-
mandeering" state legislature voting may well be, or perhaps congres-
sional  abolition  of the  immunities  from  damages  of  state judicial
officers)  must remain subject to judicial  review.
the Federal Power to Require Compliance with ICJ Orders of Provisional  Measures, 92 AM. J.
INT'L L.  683, 690  (1998)
168  See Marshall,  supra note  151,  at 1349-71  (arguing that the  l1th Amendment
was a compromise  and  its text should be given very literal  reading).  Note also  that
sovereign immunity on federal claims is in conflict with the "political axiom" that "the
judicial power of every well constituted government must be coextensive with the leg-
islative."  Cohens v. Virginia,  19  U.S.  (6 Wheat.)  264, 383-84  (1821).
169  See, e.g.,  Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251  (1918)  (holding unconstitutional
a federal prohibition  on the interstate movement of goods produced  in violation of
restrictions on  child labor),  overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.  100,  116-17
(1941);  Carter v. Carter Coal  Co.,  298 U.S.  238  (1936)  (invalidating federal Bitumi-
nous  Coal  Conservation  Act of  1935  on the  grounds that production  such  as coal
mining can only be regulated by the states),  distinguished  by NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)  (upholding a federal regulation of wages and hours in
the production of steel and essentially rejecting  Carte's reasoning).
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But the political structure of the national political branches pro-
vides multiple opportunities for consideration of the interests  of the
states  in  their governmental  capacities.i70  Legislation  applicable  to
the states often reflects this consideration.  For example,  the Fair La-
bor Standards Act  (FLSA) itself includes a set of exemptions from its
substantive coverage  provisions for states that in large part mirror ex-
emptions  extended  to federal  employees;  as  to  covered  employees,
the  remedies  available  against  the  federal  and  state  governments
under the FLSA appear quite similar.' 7'  Since Congress is concerned
with protecting the sovereign  capacities  of the United States  govern-
ment, it is unlikely to extend to the United States remedies or liabili-
ties  that would  unduly  interfere with  those  governing capacities;  if
similar remedies are extended against states, the political process will
probably have accounted for any peculiarly governmental interests af-
fected.  Were  the Court to overrule  Seminole Tribe and/or Alden, and
acknowledge  congressional  power  to subject states  to suits for  dam-
ages under otherwise valid federal laws,  courts could seek to enforce
"safeguards"  designed  to  encourage  such  legislative  attention.  The
Court might consider establishing a presumption under Article I stat-
utes that remedies that exist as against the United States  can be ex-
tended  to  the  states  without  threatening  their  constitutional
sovereignty; remedies  against states that do not extend to the United
States would need to be separately evaluated to consider whether they
unduly interfere with the governmental functions  (or uniquely sover-
eign interests)  of the states.'7 2
Such an approach would rely primarily on the political process to
safeguard the governmental functions and existence of states by tying
the federal government's treatment of states in part to its treatment of
itself. It offers the advantage  of restoring the Court to a basic posture
of deference  to Congress and the national political process in resolv-
ing questions of federalism-both on the suability of states on federal
causes  of action and on the substantive  reach of federal legislation.
170  The record of the 104th Congress should give pause to those who say that the
political process does not protect interests of states.  See Unfunded Mandates Reform
Act of 1995,  2 U.S.C.  §§ 1501-71  (1994 & Supp. 1997).  So too, as Professor Meltzer
points out, does  the recently re-issued  Executive  Order on Federalism,  see Meltzer,
supra note 12,  at 1024-25, and the substantial attention being given in Congress to
the pending Federalism Accountability Act.
171  See 29  U.S.C.  §§ 203(e) (2) (A)-(C); 203  (e) (4) (A)-(B);  213  (b) (20)  (1994 &
Supp. 1997).
172  For further elaboration, see Jackson, supra note 1. Such a presumption might
operate  both at the  level  of constitutional  law,  that is,  as a  guide  to  determining
whether a statute can constitutionally be applied to the states as against a federalism
challenge, and as a guide to interpreting ambiguous statutes.
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Deference  is appropriate not only because  of the structure of the na-
tional legislative  process involving the President and Congress  (as fa-
miliarly argued by Wechsler'7 3),  but also because history suggests that
in enforcing what the Court sees as substantial federalism-based  limits
on national power not clearly drawn from the Constitution's text and
structure, the Court is particularly unlikely to elucidate enduring con-
stitutional principles  on the inevitably practical, political  questions  of
federalism.  The political safeguards of federalism can be given effect
through judicially-developed  clear statement rules and through a pre-
sumption that exemptions  Congress sees fit to provide to the federal
government  (either from liability or particular remedies in federal Ar-
ticle I statutes)  ordinarily should be extended  to the states as constitu-
tionally  sovereign  governments.  Such  a presumption  would  go  far
toward meeting Professor Woolhandler's  concerns  about the capaci-
ties for unlimited damages awards to impair the fiscal integrity of the
states, for the federal government would be most unlikely to authorize
such unlimited awards  against itself.'74  While  this approach  also has
173  See Herbert Wechsler,  The Political  Safeguards of  Federalism: The Role of the States
in  the  Composition and Selection  of the National Government, 54  COLUM.  L.  REv.  543
(1954).  For a more extreme version, see JESSE  H. CHOPER, JUDIcIAL  REVIEw AND  THE
NATIONAL  PoLrrcAL  PROCESS  (1980).  For an excellent  contemporary  overview,  see
DAVID  SHAPIRO,  FEDERALISM:  A DIALOGUE  (1995),  and for an illuminating  analysis  of
how the operation of political parties, organized through state-by-state  organizations,
facilitate national attention to state problems, see Larry Kramer,  Understanding  Federal-
ism, 47 VAND.  L. REv.  1485  (1994).  I want to resist arguments from the abolition  of
state  legislative  selection  of the Senators  that suggest  that the national  government
will no longer, if once it did, reflect appropriately the interests of the states.  See, e.g.,
id. at 1508  (asserting that "direct representation in this body was the chief protection
afforded to state institutions  in  the original  plan of the Constitution" and that "this
protection basically evaporated with the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment").
First,  note the  fundamental  ambiguity  in  the  10th  amendment whether  the rights
being protected are those of the "states" or the "people."  Now, consider that the 17th
Amendment was intended to change the Constitution, and to do so in the direction of
giving the  views of the people in the states more weight in the national legislature than
the views of the state legislatures. To the extent that the views of the state governments
have less weight now than they did before, this is as a consequence of lawful constitu-
tional change and should be accepted  as such, rather than being relied on  to justify
the new judicial activism  of the Rehnquist Court's federalism  revival.  Federal  Sena-
tors and Representatives  still  have to  run for office from districts  bounded by state
lines, and still frequently emerge from prior experience in local and state office.  See id
at 1509-11.  The Gingrich Congress illustrated that if the people want to devolve pow-
ers from the federal  to the state  governments, the political process provides  mecha-
nisms to do so.  See supra note  170.
174  The  statute  under which  the  plaintiff in  Florida Prepaid sued  provided  that
states  and  state  entities  "shall be  subject to  the provisions  of this  title  in  the same
manner and  to the same extent as any nongovernmental  entity."  35 U.S.C. § 271 (h)
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its difficulties, 175  I offer it  to suggest that abandoning reliance on an
expansive  constitutional  doctrine  of state  sovereign  immunity  doc-
trine  need not abandon  all judicial  review  of remedies  against  the
states.
CONCLUSION
The Court's present position-that Congress has substantive law-
making power to subject states to the federal minimum wage, or pat-
ent laws, but does not have power to authorize  enforcement of those
laws  through  ordinarily  available judicial  remedies-is  unstable.  It
flies in  the face of modem notions ofjustice, of basic principles of the
supremacy of federal law, and of the "axiom" that the judicial power
in  a well-designed government is coextensive with the legislative and is
thus  difficult to defend.  Professor Woolhandler's  article intriguingly
suggests that "giving up" the authority to subject states to private suits
(1994 & Supp. 1997).  Compare 35 U.S.C. §§ 283-85 (1994 & Supp. 1997)  (containing
the general provisions  of the patent laws,  which authorize  injunctions,  damages  in-
cluding  treble  damages,  and  in  exceptional  cases  attorneys  fees),  with  28  U.S.C.
§ 1498  (1994 & Supp. 1997)  (providing that infringement actions against the United
States shall be brought in the United States Court of Federal Claims for recovery  of
"reasonable and entire  compensation," and authorizing attorney fees in suits by par-
ticular plaintiffs  only and subject to defense by the United States that its position was
substantially justified, but not authorizing injunctive relief).  For dueling descriptions
of the  magnitude of these differences  in  the majority  and dissenting  opinions, see
Rorida  Prepaid, 119 S.  Ct. at 2216 n.11,  and id at 2218 n.15  (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Note thatJustice Stevens seeks to justify the unavailability of injunctions on "uniquely
federal"  grounds,  that  they  would  interfere  with  military  procurement.  See  id.
Whether this would justify the differential remedial treatment of the state and federal
governments  as against a claimed burden  on state sovereignty, should my proposed
alternative  doctrine be adopted, is a question for another day.
175  The  difficulties arise  because  there are a number of arguably legitimate  rea-
sons for Congress to extend remedies against states and not to the national  govern-
ment-for example, if states  engage in a particular commercial activity,  e.g., college
savings funds, or community health care-that the federal government does not.  Cf
supra note  174  (noting asserted  military justification  for limiting  patent  remedies
against  the  federal  government).  Where  the  presumption  described  above  is  not
met-that is, where states are subject to remedies under Article I statutes that do not
apply to the federal government-the states' objections would need to be evaluated in
a contextually sensitive and sensible way.  It may be unavoidable in such an analysis to
revisit some version of the "traditional government functions" test disavowed by the
Court in  Garcia v.  San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authoity, 469  U.S.  528  (1985).
Since the Court has implied that some sort of contextualized balancing may be appro-
priate in  deciding whether  "generally applicable" laws  such as  the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act can be applied to the states, this may not be so great a drawback.  See Printz
v.  United States, 521  U.S. 898,  932  (1997)  (citing with apparent approval National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.  833  (1976)).
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might be  the pragmatic  cost to bear for sustaining federal power to
impose substantive  regulations  on  the states.  But if so,  the  costs  of
accepting such a regime  should not be minimized, and especially by
academics:  Although  the current global  trend  is increasingly  to sub-
ject governments to the rule of law, the regime Woolhandler approves
and that the Court has created elevates apparent improvements in ma-
terial welfare  over the  rule  of law by permitting  Congress  to extend
laws promoting the national economy to the states but  making past
violations  of such  laws  in large measure  cost-free  to  infringing state
governments.
Let me return to an opening comment.  It is rare for an opinion
of an Article III court, including the Supreme Court, to invoke justice
as a basis for decision.1 76  I suppose the fear is  that invoking justice
might be a signal that the "personal preferences" of the judges are in
play,  rather  than  the  "law." '177  The opposition  of "law"  to  'Justice"
raises large jurisprudential issues that I cannot address here.  But let
me suggest that in the realm of sovereign  immunity, recognizing  its
unjust effects  is not a simple  preference  but a widely and long-held
understanding,  going back in the Court's cases  to  Lee  (1882)  and to
the majority opinions in  Chisholm (1793),  that sovereign  immunity is
in some  respects unjust.  Surely the adoption of the narrowly worded
Eleventh Amendment need not be understood to have endorsed that
injustice as a general proposition, given the Preamble to the Constitu-
tion. Judicial deference  to congressional  processes,  coupled with the
principle  "when in doubt let justice be  done," should  have  dictated
different results in these cases.
176  In law reviews,  however, at least two current Supreme  Court Justices  have in-
voked justice as a basis for serious reexamination of sovereign immunity doctrines.  In
1993,  three years before  Seminole Tribe overruled  Union Gas to begin  the current ex-
pansionary wave immunizing states from private liabilities for violations of federal law,
Justice  Stevens wrote,
In suggesting a broader examination of the entire doctrine of sovereign  im-
munity, I  endorse  the views  expressed  in  an unusually  perceptive  article
written  by  an  associate  professor  of  law  at  the  University  of Virginia  in
1970  ...  referring to an area in which he thought that the doctrine  of fed-
eral  sovereign  immunity  had  "made  its  most blatant  affront  to  the  basic
precepts of justice."
Stevens, supra  note 6, at 1129  (quoting Antonin Scalia,  Sovereign Immunity and Nonstat-
utory Review of  Federal  Administrative  Action: Some Conclusions  from the Public Lands Cases,
68 MICH.  L. REV. 867,  868  (1970)).
177  Cf Robin West, Toward Humanistic Theories of Legal  Justice,  10 CARwozo STUD.  L.
& LIT. 147 (1998)  (noting influence ofJustice Holmes's comment that "when lawyers
in his courtroom make  appeal to justice, he stops listening").
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